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Abstract 
Metacognitions play a crucial role in the development and maintenance of psychiatric 
disorders, such as depression and anxiety. Its function in anorexia nervosa (AN), however, 
has been neglected. Examining the role of metacognitions in AN may prove useful for 
developing the AN conceptualization currently lacking. Additionally, it may provide a 
desperately needed new route for AN treatment, as no efficacious treatment for adult AN is 
available to date. This study aimed to build on preliminary findings suggesting that 
individuals with AN are characterized by the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS), the vital 
component in the Self-regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model underlying 
metacognitive processes. Hence, quantitative and qualitative measures of individuals with 
AN, dieting, and non-dieting adult women were examined to ascertain whether these groups 
embodied differences in their metacognitive frequency and nature. ANOVA, bivariate 
correlation, and ANCOVA were used for data analysis. Findings showed that the AN sample 
experienced higher overall metacognitions; particularly negative metacognitions and 
metacognitions around control. When anxiety and depression were controlled for, however, 
the association became non-significant. Nonetheless, anxious and depressive symptoms are 
greatly intertwined with eating symptoms and increased metacognitions in the AN sample are 
still highly plausible. Metacognitive themes endorsed by the AN sample were around 
sociability and control. Thought control strategies were found to be the same in all groups; 
however, the AN sample endorsed a higher utilization of punishment and a lower utilization 
of distraction. Several limitations including small AN sample size and no psychiatric control 
group should be taken into account. Overall, however, findings suggested that, because the 
AN sample was characteristic of the CAS and the S-REF model, dysfunctional 
metacognitions may be worth targeting in AN treatment.  
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Introduction: The Type and Frequency of Metacognitions in Women dieting, not 
dieting, and with Anorexia Nervosa 
 
Research on metacognition has grown substantially in the last few decades (Efklides, 
2008). Upon review, the breadth of psychological fields discussing metacognitive research 
becomes noticeable: metacognition is examined in theory of mind in developmental 
psychology (e.g. Lysaker et al., 2011; Tuch, 2011), metamemory analysed in cognitive and 
experimental psychology (e.g. Castel, McGillivray, & Friedman, 2012; Cosentino, Metcalfe, 
Holmes, Steffener, & Stern, 2011), and self-regulated learning discussed in educational 
psychology (e.g. Efklides, 2011; Postholm, 2011) to name but a few. Naturally, 
metacognitive research has also been undertaken in the field of clinical psychology (e.g. 
Dimaggio et al., 2011; Gumley, 2011). This research on metacognitions is extensive due to 
the fact that metacognitions are inevitably intertwined with consciousness and awareness of 
mental states (Koriat, 2007). Indeed, metacognitions are at the root of social interaction, 
every day memory, and scientific thinking (King, 1998). A concept so fundamental to daily 
living that may be able to provide insight into the development and maintenance of 
psychiatric disorders is crucial to study and understand in order to progress in the field of 
clinical psychology. 
Wells (2009a, p. 105) explained metacognitions as “cognitive factors that monitor, 
interpret and control thinking”. The term metacognitions first surfaced in 1979, when Flavell 
described knowledge of a person‟s own cognitive processes, including metacognitive 
knowledge, experiences, goals, and actions (Flavell, 1979). In later years, Wells (1995, 1999, 
2000, 2009b) refined these to incorporate metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
experiences, and metacognitive strategies.  
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Despite the large amount of literature on metacognitions, its role in Eating Disorders 
has been neglected. This study, therefore, investigates the role metacognitions play in the 
maintenance and development of anorexia nervosa (AN) by comparing questionnaire results 
across three different samples of adult women: those dieting, those not dieting, and patients 
with AN. Dieting and non-dieting women were recruited from a University; AN patients from 
an Eating Disorder Service. Similarities and differences in metacognitive knowledge, 
experiences, and strategies are examined by analysing the quantitative and qualitative 
questionnaire results between the participant groups. Next, implications for the future 
understanding, conceptualization, and treatment of AN are discussed. AN in particular was 
selected for study, as a need for further research on an underlying conceptualization and 
effective treatment is required. No one treatment intervention for women with AN has 
reached the status of an efficacious treatment (Hay, 2004; Mitchell, Steffen, Cook Myers, & 
Roerig, 2005). Although Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is often used, its lack of 
evidence for this population remains a concern; hence, the search for new treatment 
interventions is vital. 
This thesis focuses solely on AN, not on any other eating disorders. Bulimia nervosa 
(BN) was excluded because the usefulness and effectiveness of CBT for BN, as well as the 
underlying cognitive model for BN have been confirmed in a large multicentre study (Agras, 
Walsh, Fairburn, Wilson, & Kraemer, 2002). Additionally, Interpersonal Therapy has been 
shown to be just as efficacious a treatment; however, a slightly longer timeframe is needed to 
produce similar results (Hay & Bacaltchuk, 2000). Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
(ED-NOS), even though it is the most frequent Eating Disorder diagnosis given (Fairburn & 
Bohn, 2005), was also excluded because it is currently poorly understood (Cooper, 2005) and 
would exceed the scope of this research.  
 
4 
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter I is an introductory chapter 
encompassing a general thesis overview: a background of this study; the purpose and 
significance of the research undertaken; and the aims of this research. Chapter II outlines a 
definition of terms; a description of the underlying theoretical framework; a literature review; 
and hypotheses for this study. Chapter III describes the methodology utilized in this study, 
including the selection of participants, the data collection process, materials used, and the 
data analysis procedures. Chapter IV presents the study findings. Descriptive statistics, 
ANOVA, bivariate correlation, and ANCOVA are displayed, examined, and interpreted. 
Lastly, Chapter V provides a summary of the entire study; a discussion of the study findings; 
implications of these findings for theory and practice; study conclusions; and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
Context and Background  
The importance of metacognitions in various psychiatric disorders has been 
established (e.g. Dimaggio et al., 2011; García-Montesa, Pérez-Álvarezb, Balbuenac, 
Garcelán, & Cangas, 2006; Lysaker et al., 2010; Wells, 2000). The knowledge gained has 
been utilized to develop specific interventions, such as Metacognitive Therapy (MCT) for 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; see Wells, 1995, 2008, 2009b) and Depression (Wells, 
2009b; Wells et al., 2007). Similar problematic metacognitions present in mood and anxiety 
disorder patients appear to be prominent in AN patients, and hence an in-depth investigation 
of whether targeting metacognitions decreases eating disorder symptoms is warranted. 
Problematic metacognitions include worry (Levinson & Rodebaugh, 2012; Pallister & 
Waller, 2008), rumination (Cowdrey & Park, 2011; Cowdrey & Park, 2012; Wolff & Serpell, 
1998); attention to threat stimuli (Bruha, 2010; Fairburn, Shafran, & Cooper, 1999; Shafran, 
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Fairburn, Robinson, & Lask, 2003); unhelpful coping strategies, such as emotional avoidance 
(Corstorphine, Mountford, Tomlinson, Waller, & Meyer, 2007; Schmidt & Treasure, 2006; 
Wildes, Ringham, & Markus, 2010) and thought suppression (Geller, Cockell, Hewitt, 
Goldner, & Flett, 2000; Hambrook et al., 2011); and a perseverative thinking style (Abbate-
Daga et al., 2011; Tchanturia, Morris et al., 2004). These traits will each be looked at in turn 
in the literature review. 
 
Purpose and Significance 
The current study on metacognitive processes in AN is an expansion on the few 
preliminary studies that have examined this topic. Previous studies found significantly 
increased levels of metacognitive dysfunction, as measured by the Metacognitive 
Questionnaire (MCQ-30) (Cooper, Grocutt, Deepak, & Bailey, 2007; Konstantellou & 
Reynolds, 2010; McDermott & Rushford, 2011), and indicated the need for further and more 
detailed validation of findings. This thesis appeared to be the next logical line of inquiry in 
order to ascertain whether metacognitions in AN patients are qualitatively or quantitatively 
different from dieting and non-dieting controls to warrant metacognitive intervention. 
Acquiring further information about the type, extent, and frequency of metacognitions may 
help to explain how AN develops and how it is maintained. Studying metacognitions may 
give insight into certain mechanisms or particular risk factors that perhaps lead dieting 
women to develop AN. Alternatively, protective metacognitive processes that provide 
resilience towards AN may be ascertained in dieting participants. The methodology of this 
study, while also incorporating the use of the MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), 
includes various other qualitative and quantitative measures related to metacognition, such as 
the Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994) in order to gather detailed results 
and answer the study questions. 
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The lack of effective or efficacious interventions in the treatment of AN becomes 
evident when conducting research (Hay, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005). Although a variety of 
interventions are utilized to treat adults with AN, evidence for the superiority of any 
particular intervention is lacking (Bulik, Berkman, Brownley, Sedway, & Lohr, 2007): 
Pharmacological interventions alone for treating AN are inappropriate (Biederman et al., 
1985; Kaye et al., 2001; Klibanski, Biller, Schoenfeld, Herzog, & Saxe, 1995), family 
therapy is only supported in adolescent samples (Hay, 2004; Smith & Cook-Cottone, 2011), 
cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) has limited effectiveness (Dare, Eisler, Russell, Treasure, & 
Dodge, 2001; Treasure et al., 1995), and CBT was only found to be promising after weight 
restoration (F. Carter et al., 2005; Channon, de Silva, Hemsley, & Perkins, 1989; Pike, 
Walsh, Vitousek, Wilson, & Bauer, 2003). Additionally, neither inpatient nor outpatient 
treatment display greater treatment efficacy (Biederman et al., 1985; Meguerditchian et al., 
2010), leaving mental health professionals ambivalent about choosing the most appropriate 
treatment intervention for AN. 
 
Aims 
The principal aims of this research are as follows: 
1. To examine the frequency of metacognitions between dieting, non-dieting, and adult 
women diagnosed with AN. 
2. To explore qualitative similarities and differences in metacognitions between dieting, 
non-dieting, and AN diagnosed adult women in both type and frequency. 
3. To examine the degree of utilization, function, and success of using metacognitive 
control strategies between dieting, non-dieting, and adult women diagnosed with AN.  
4. To ascertain whether metacognitive components perhaps contribute to the 
development or maintenance of AN.   
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Literature Review 
Anorexia Nervosa 
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is categorised as one of three eating disorders alongside 
bulimia nervosa (BN), and Eating Disorder not otherwise specified (ED-NOS) in the current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). AN is a debilitating and often long-term struggle for individuals living 
with the disorder. According to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
AN is characterized by a triad of symptoms: extremely low body weight comparative to age 
and height, an intense fear of gaining weight, and a negatively distorted self- and body-
image. AN is classified into two subtypes: the restricting type, and the binge-eating/purging 
type. Hence, two clinical presentations can be observed. 
The AN restricting type typically has an early onset in adolescence and often includes 
either amenorrhea or abnormal menses. Food restriction lies at the core of the restricting 
subtype and individuals often consume less than 1000 calories a day. As a consequence of 
food restraint, the body weight of someone with AN restricting type is significantly below 
average. Weight tends to lie somewhere between 50% or 60% of the expected weight when 
taking age and height into consideration (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
The binge-eating/purging subtype of AN differentiates itself from the restricting type 
by including the criteria of binge-eating and/or engaging in behaviours to compensate for 
weight gain, known as purging. Purging behaviours include self-induced vomiting, misusing 
laxatives, and misusing diuretics and/or other purgatives. This binge-eating/purging subtype 
differs from BN solely through significantly lower Body Mass Index (BMI; American 
Psychological Association, 2000). 
Because of the egosyntonic nature of AN, denial of eating and weight problems are 
common. Obsessive compulsive and perfectionistic personality traits are often observed, and 
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are evident through tasks such as rigid exercise routines and stringent dietary restrictions 
(Hersen, Turner, & Beidel, 2007). 
The course and prognosis of AN is highly variable and has the tendency to shift from 
one subtype to another. A significant portion of individuals who are first diagnosed with the 
restricting subtype of AN, develop binge eating or purging behaviours and are, thus, 
reclassified into the binge-eating/purging subtype. Such shifts usually occur within the first 
five years of AN onset, whereas other individuals may warrant a later diagnostic change to 
BN.  The course of AN typically unfolds in one of three ways: either recovery after a single 
episode, a fluctuating pattern of weight gain and relapse, or chronic deterioration over 
multiple years (American Psychological Association, 2000).  
In the past, AN has been viewed as an exclusively Western disorder. This is certainly 
no longer the case, as studies show a rise of AN cases in other cultures, such as Japan and 
China, where women are increasingly exposed to westernization and cultural change 
(Khandelwal & Saxena, 1990; Lee, 1996; Loue & Sajatovic, 2004; Rieger, Touyz, Swain, & 
Beumont, 2001). Individuals with AN have the highest mortality rate of all psychiatric 
conditions (Morris & Twaddle, 2006; Sullivan, 1995), not to mention significant functional 
impairment (Finfgeld, 2002; Sue & Birmingham, 2003). The rate of 0.5% is often used as a 
valid lifetime prevalence regarding AN (American Psychiatric Association, 2000); however, 
figures are steadily rising (Lee, 1996). In fact, a study in 2006 (Bulik et al., 2006) reported an 
increased AN lifetime prevalence rate of 1.2% for women, and 0.29% for men, demonstrating 
urgent research need for AN. Treatment guidelines are still tentative (Hay, 2004). Therefore, 
metacognitions may help to give a better understanding of the development and/or 
maintenance factors of AN.  
 
9 
 
Therapy for Anorexia Nervosa 
Treatment efficacy for AN appears to be moderate at best and ineffective at worst. 
Recovery rates vary from study to study. Long-term outcome studies indicate recovery rates 
ranging from 25% to 70% (Eckert, Halmi, Marchi, Grove, & Crosby, 1995; Lowe et al., 
2001; Steinhausen, 2002; Strober, Freeman, & Morrell, 2002). Higher recovery rates have 
been found in adolescent samples, most likely due to the lower chronicity of AN in the 
adolescent age range  (Bulik et al., 2007). Family therapy frequently demonstrates this high 
success rate for adolescent samples (Lock, 2011; Smith & Cook-Cottone, 2011). However, as 
mentioned previously, no firm conclusions about treatment efficacy in adults can be drawn 
from any pharmacological or psychotherapeutic interventions (Mitchell et al., 2005).  
Studies carried out in such uncertain and inconclusive terrain are infiltrated by 
numerous research limitations. These include: limited sample sizes, high attrition rates, 
inadequate or lacking randomization procedures, differences in standard care, intertwining of 
treatment interventions, vagueness of illness stage, insufficient distinction between pre or 
post weight restoration, and flawed methodologies (see Bulik et al., 2007; Guarda, 2008; 
Mahon, 2000). Nevertheless, CBT appears to be the most popular treatment option for adult 
AN patients in many settings (Roth & Fonagy, 2005). This is probably due to CBT‟s general 
popularity as a psychotherapeutic treatment intervention as well as the fact that the 
effectiveness of CBT for BN has been firmly established (Wilson, Fairburn, Agras, Walsh, & 
Kraemer, 2002). 
Being an egosyntonic disorder, AN brings with it many barriers when conducting 
treatment. Battling with various levels of engagement is very common (Cooper, 2005). 
Individuals with AN are often ambivalent about seeking treatment and changing their eating 
behaviour (Gale, Holliday, Troop, Serpell, & Treasure, 2006). Frequently, pressure from 
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family members or friends, rather than personal motivation, persuades individuals with AN to 
attend treatment services (Vitousek, Watson, & Wilson, 1996). Resistance is typical 
throughout treatment, which unfortunately increases the probability of treatment 
discontinuation (Mahon, 2000). High attrition rates have been consistently found (e.g. 
Steiner, Mazer, & Litt, 1990; Zeeck, Hartmann, Buchholz, & Herzog, 2005); in a few studies 
they have exceeded 50% (Vandereycken & Pierloot, 1983; Woodside, Carter, & Blackmore, 
2004). 
Research into the field of metacognitions in AN is, therefore, fitting. Other treatment 
modalities must be explored. Supporters of metacognitive treatments advocate that merely 
modifying maladaptive cognitions is unlikely to prove effective if the cognitive processes 
underlying these thoughts are neglected (McDermott & Rushford, 2011). An underlying AN 
model as a basis for AN intervention is lacking and must be developed. Metacognitive 
principles explaining the development and maintenance of AN appear to hold promise in the 
literature. 
 
The Underlying Metacognitive Model: The Self-regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) 
Past cognitive explanations of psychiatric disorders have centred around the content 
of thoughts rather than on the process of thinking about thoughts. Dysfunctional thoughts and 
beliefs have been targeted to address the issue of psychopathology. While schema theory and 
cognitive therapy address the content of people‟s thoughts, these theories do not explain 
thinking styles and thought patterns. To explore these aspects, beliefs about thoughts and 
individual strategies of controlling thoughts must be discerned. This is where metacognitive 
beliefs become relevant and help explain AN.  
Metacognitive dysfunction rests upon the Self-regulatory executive function model 
(S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1994; See Figure 1). S-REF aims to express the “reciprocal 
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causal interplay between multiple components of cognition, including beliefs, metacognitions, 
attentional control, on-line processing, and self-regulation (Wells, 2000, p. 15). The S-REF 
model proposes that cognitive processes are distributed across three interacting levels: low 
level processing, cognitive style, and the meta-system (Wells, 2000, 2009a, 2009b).  
 
Figure 1: The Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model taken from Wells (2009)  
 
Lower level processing is an automatic and reflexive process. It is stimulus driven and 
functions outside of conscious awareness, occasionally reaching into consciousness. 
Cognitive style is the conscious appraisal of events and controls thoughts and actions. It is 
dependent on attentional resources to execute cognitive processes. This cognitive processing 
is usually voluntary: the individual is consciously aware of the processing. However, 
processing may also weave out of conscious awareness, for example when psychopathology 
is present in the individual. The meta-system is required for on-line processing, as it cannot 
function independently. The cognitive level relies on self knowledge from the meta-system to 
guide it. The meta-system can therefore be described as a store of metacognitions, that is, 
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self-knowledge stored in long term memory. This meta-system guides cognitive processing 
toward one‟s goal of an activated plan. Arrow a of Figure 1 illustrates the effect of appraisals 
and coping behaviour on beliefs. For example avoiding feared experiences, such as anxiety, 
prevents an individual discovering that experiencing that anxiety is in fact harmless. Arrow b 
depicts the effect of coping and thinking styles on emotion- and lower-level processing. For 
example, worrying maintains emotional arousal and blocks emotional processes. Arrow c 
signifies the interplay between the lower level processing and the meta-system (Wells, 2000, 
2009a, 2009b) 
 S-REF processing is initially instigated automatically. This automatic processing can 
be generated internally by negative, threat-related thoughts or externally by threat stimuli. 
Once activated, the store of self-knowledge, which is lodged in long term memory, is 
accessed to generate threat appraisals and to select coping strategies. The activated 
knowledge base is comprised of broad plans for appraisal and coping, which are modified 
and tailored to the particular situation at hand. These, in turn, are dependent on the feedback 
of success or failure regarding the processes adopted. Therefore, metacognitions guide S-REF 
processing and the reciprocal effects of processing thoughts and beliefs in long term memory 
(Wells, 2000, 2009a, 2009b). 
 Usually, S-REF activity is short-lived. It does not take long to self regulate and to 
choose a strategy that successfully manages a feeling of discrepancy. An individual either 
chooses a task-focused coping strategy or alternatively, modifies an existing belief. For 
example, if hungry, self-knowledge guides our appraisal of hunger and directs an action in 
order to return to a feeling of satiety: we eat. When psychopathology is implicated, however, 
this process changes. The person suffering from a psychiatric disorder has difficulties 
achieving a self-regulatory goal, signifying that the S-REF cycle has become more pervasive. 
Failure to attain goals may rest on a number of factors: inappropriate coping strategies may 
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be selected; negative self-knowledge may maintain or perpetuate repeated negative self-
appraisals of oneself and one‟s current state; inappropriate goals may be selected; or external 
constraints may be problematic. These difficulties can be resolved if the individual displays 
flexibility in changing either their behaviour or beliefs. In psychopathology, however, the 
individual‟s goals are often inflexible and rigid. Indeed, effective self-regulation may seem 
impossible. The individual‟s scope for action and cognition is limited; inappropriate goals 
may act as barriers. Therefore, dealing with the dysfunction and attempting to restructure 
cognition often fails (Wells, 2000). S-REF activity is, thus, either maintained, prolonged, or 
repeated.  
Numerous factors contribute to this: the difficulty of bringing threats under personal 
control; self-control problems due to the environment or external stimuli; or, as is most 
common, individual factors. Examples of such individual factors include faulty appraisals 
concerning internal control, utilization of unhelpful coping strategies, and dysfunctional self-
knowledge pertaining to self-regulation or unrealistic goals. One of the most important 
factors according to this model is the contribution of metacognitive beliefs. For example, an 
individual may believe that worry or rumination represents a desirable and/or an effective 
coping strategies for self-regulation (Wells, 2000). Both positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs influence someone‟s appraisals, in turn guiding cognitions and subsequent actions 
(Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). The metacognitive component, therefore, contributes to 
the development and maintenance of psychopathology due to various ineffective response 
styles, such as suppression or avoidance. Such ineffective response styles and maladaptive 
strategies use up valuable processing resources without providing information to disconfirm 
faulty appraisals or negative beliefs. Instead, the individual becomes more self-focused, 
sensitive to biases, and fails to implement other, more effective strategies (Wells, 2000). 
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Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS) 
At the core of the S-REF model is that psychopathology is developed and/or 
maintained by a particular toxic style of thinking called Cognitive Attentional Syndrome 
(CAS; Wells, 2009b). Feelings of sadness, anger, anxiety, or worthlessness are felt by 
everyone at various times in their lives but are usually isolated and fleeting. The CAS, 
however, locks people experiencing psychopathology into a repetitive and prolonged pattern 
of negative thoughts or sensations so that feelings of sadness, anger, anxiety, or worthlessness 
tend to be more common and permanent. The CAS may, therefore, be characterized by a 
perseverative thinking style and attentional preoccupation with threatening stimuli, worry, 
rumination, and/or unhelpful coping strategies. Once caught in this negative pattern of 
thinking, negative emotions tend to be maintained and/or strengthened. This, in turn, 
preserves the individual‟s sense of threat (Wells, 2000, 2009a). 
The CAS arises from erroneous knowledge and beliefs that are metacognitive in 
nature, and led by the meta-system. CAS may, hence, lead to psychological disturbances in 
several different ways: CAS appraisals and coping behaviours may have a negative effect on 
beliefs, CAS thinking style and coping may have a negative effect in low-level automatic and 
emotion-level processing, or the CAS may influence the relationship between higher and 
lower processing (e.g. retrieval of knowledge) (Wells, 1999). This way, the S-REF model 
explains how dysfunctional metacognitions may lead to and/or perpetuate disorders, such as 
AN. 
 
Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS) in AN 
Central aspects in the CAS thought process suggested to uphold disorders such as AN 
are examined below. These include: worry and rumination; attention to threat stimuli; 
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unhelpful strategies, such as emotional avoidance and suppression of thoughts; and a 
perseverative thinking style. 
Worry and Rumination. Worry and Rumination appear to be salient in many 
psychiatric disorders, including Eating Disorders (Ehrings & Watkins, 2008; Watkins, 2008). 
Worry, constitutes „„a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable (Brokovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10)”. Worrying 
represents an attempt to resolve an issue, whose outcome is uncertain and which contains the 
possibility of negative consequences. Worry about negative evaluation, in particular, is 
reported to predict disordered eating above other fears and worries (Levinson & Rodebaugh, 
2012). In fact, social phobia is elevated in patients with AN (DeKaye, Bulik, Thornton, 
Barbarich, & Masters, 2004; Pallister & Waller, 2008). Anxiety disorders in general are also 
much higher in patients with AN than in controls (Pallister & Waller, 2008); lifetime 
prevalence rates as high as 83% have been suggested (Godart, Flament, Lecrubier, & 
Jeammet, 2000). GAD statistics too, have been significant: Individuals with AN have a 30% 
to 50% lifetime prevalence rate of developing GAD (Godart et al., 2003; Lilenfeld et al., 
1998). Due to this, GAD theories have been applied to AN: chronic worry states, triggered by 
interceptive cues, social evaluation, and food/weight related cues can manifest themselves as 
hypervigilance relating to weight and shape changes. Natural fluctuations in shape and 
weight may consequently lead to the cognitive misinterpretation of future threat and harm 
(Hildebrandt, Bacow, Markella, & Loeb, 2010). 
Rumination characterises thoughts that passively focus an individual‟s attention to 
negative symptoms and pessimistic implications of these symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998). Rumination has most notably been studied with regards to depression (Lyubomirsky 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) and has been shown to predict its onset (Robinson & Alloy, 2003; 
Roelofs et al., 2009), maintenance (Lara, Klein, & Kasch, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), 
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and recurrence (Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998; Watkins et al., 2007). Broadly speaking, 
rumination is divided into two aspects that may perform independent functions in an 
individual‟s thinking processes: the first is reflection; the second, brooding.  
While reflection has been associated with adaptive coping strategies, insight, and 
behaviour change (Surrence, Miranda, Marroquin, & Chan, 2009), brooding is seen as an 
information processing strategy related to maladaptive emotion regulation, symptom 
persistence, and the failure to achieve goals (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Hayes et al., 2004; 
Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Rumination about eating, shape, and weight 
represents a core feature of EDs (Wolff & Serpell, 1998). Various research (Cowdrey & Park, 
2011; Cowdrey & Park, 2012; Rawal, Park, & Williams, 2010) found that AN patients 
displayed positive beliefs about the benefits of rumination and increased brooding. The focus 
on brooding may reflect an attention bias in AN patients to attend more to discrepant 
information, that is, current vs. ideal states (Park, Dunn, & Barnard, 2011). This is not 
surprising given the emphasis of weight, shape, and eating preoccupation in the DSM-IV AN 
diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Neuro-imaging and behavioural 
studies have repeatedly verified the presence of attentional biases and hypervigilance to food 
or body-related cues in AN patients (Brooks, Prince, Stahl, Campbell, & Treasure, 2011). 
Such preoccupation with food, weight, and shape, and the discrepancy individuals with AN 
perceive due to their cognitive distortions inextricably links worry and rumination with their 
disorder. 
Attention to threat stimuli. Evidence suggests that food and weight carry different 
connotations for those with and without AN (Bruha, 2010). In AN, eating and weight gain is 
seen as a threat that must constantly remain under scrutiny: excessive focus is placed on 
internal events, external events, and negative information about shape, weight, and food. 
Unfortunately, this focus increases awareness of threats, negative affect, and anxiety (Wells, 
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2008). Bruha (2010) argued that those with AN symptoms have difficulty with, and are less 
likely to positively manage their thoughts, sensations, and feelings with regards to eating. 
Individuals with AN appear to display difficulties acting with awareness and consequently 
make decisions based on faulty rationale or errors in judgement. Little forethought or 
consequential thinking seems to be actively present in the cognitive processes of individuals 
with AN. Additionally, individuals with AN are substantially more judgemental about food, 
their body, and eating leading to decisions that are potentially harmful, such as purging 
(Bruha, 2010). Hypervigilance to threat monitoring in AN patients can manifest itself in body 
checking (Shafran et al., 2003), which is characterised by frequent weighing, frequent mirror 
checks, or comparing one‟s weight and shape to other people‟s (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Information obtained from body checking is seen as a threat to control, 
which acts to maintain dietary restriction (Fairburn et al., 1999). Body checking lies in direct 
opposition to body avoidance, a strategy also commonly adopted (described below). 
Together, these strategies work to increase body preoccupation, body dissatisfaction, and 
overvaluation of shape and weight and are inextricably seen as threatening (Fairburn et al., 
1999). 
Unhelpful Coping Strategies of Avoidance and Suppression. Unhelpful coping 
strategies, most saliently avoidance and suppression, play a role in the development and/or 
maintenance of AN. Avoidance is used as a way to regulate inner emotional experiences. 
This strategy is  problematic, however, because it is inconsistent in regulating emotions and 
cognitions, and, thus, does not provide the individual with unambiguous evidence to combat 
erroneous beliefs (Wells, 2008). In particular, experiential avoidance has been found to be an 
important aspect of AN‟s underlying pathology (Lavender & Anderson, 2010; Lavender, 
Gratz, & Tull, 2011; Rawal et al., 2010).  
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Experiential avoidance refers to the avoidance of undesired internal events. These 
include feelings, thoughts, memories, behavioural disposition, and bodily sensations (Hayes, 
Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Experiential avoidance is suggested to be an 
important maintaining factor in AN, particularly the avoidance of emotions, emotional 
memories, and intimate relationships (Schmidt & Treasure, 2006). This type of avoidance has 
been observed in individuals with AN and has been shown to increase after AN‟s onset 
(Schmidt, Evans, Tiller, & Treasure, 1995).  
The factor in experiential avoidance most pronounced is emotional avoidance. 
Individuals with AN tend to avoid negative emotions significantly more than controls 
(Corstorphine et al., 2007; Hambrook et al., 2011; Wildes et al., 2010). Individuals with AN 
endorse the idea that outwardly presenting negative emotions is unacceptable (Schmidt & 
Treasure, 2006). Possessing negative beliefs about expressing and experiencing emotions 
appears to be one of the core features of AN (Hambrook et al., 2011), possibly due to fear of 
rejection or being criticised by others (Schmidt & Treasure, 2006).  Avoidance further 
extends to the negative feelings and thoughts about weight and shape (Geller et al., 2000). So 
called body avoidance refers to the avoidance of seeing one‟s weight or shape (Shafran et al., 
2003) by refusing to be weighed, wearing baggy clothes, or covering mirrors in the house 
(American Psychological Association, 2000). Engaging in these avoidance strategies prevents 
those with AN from disconfirming their worst weight and shape related fears (Salkovskis, 
1991). Interestingly, similar avoidance behaviour has also been found for positive emotions 
(Corstorphine et al., 2007; Forbush & Watson, 2006). This is also known as an aspect of 
„self-silencing’ (Jack & Dill, 1992): an important predictor of drive for thinness and body 
dissatisfaction (Buchholz et al., 2007). 
Suppression and avoidance, although different, still show considerable overlap. 
Individuals with AN have been reported to suppress negative feelings, in particular to 
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preserve close relationships (Geller et al., 2000; Hambrook et al., 2011). Their own thoughts 
and feelings tend to be minimized in favour of significant other‟s thoughts and feelings. 
Schmidt and Treasure (2006) proposed that avoidance too, may serve to prevent conflict and 
preserve relationships. When individuals with AN do experience specific emotions, they 
display difficulties with tolerating negative affect and distress. This, in turn, may lead them to 
use food to regulate their internal experiences, be it through restricting or binging 
(Corstorphine, 2006). It is becoming clear that individuals with AN rely heavily on 
metacognitive control strategies, such as distraction, thought suppression, and trigger 
avoidance in an attempt to control their negative emotions (Woolrich, Cooper, & Turner, 
2008). The use of these unhelpful strategies has been demonstrated by self-report 
questionnaires as well as qualitative analyses (Cockell, Geller, & Linden, 2002; Gale et al., 
2006; NordbØ, Espeset, Gulliksen, Skårderud, & Holte, 2006; Serpell, Treasure, Teasdale, & 
Sullivan, 1999).  
Perseverative Thinking Style. A further hypothesis within the AN literature is that 
cognitive flexibility is inversely related to eating disorder behaviour and can predict health 
outcomes (Wendell, Masuda, Price, & Anderson, 2010). Various studies have found 
individuals with AN to possess a perseverative thinking style in (Abbate-Daga et al., 2011; 
Tchanturia, Brecelj Anderluch et al., 2004), particularly in tasks requiring simple alternation 
and perceptual shifting (Tchanturia, Morris et al., 2004). Indeed, cognitive inflexibility in the 
form of perseveration, mental rigidity, preoccupation with details, and difficulty adapting 
may be seen as a personality factor ingrained in those with AN (Strober, 1980). Subjective 
attitudes of those with AN were positively correlated with intolerance of uncertainty 
(Konstantellou & Reynolds, 2010). Not only significantly elevated cognitive rigidity, but 
behavioural rigidity too, has been found to be present in those with AN (Zastrow et al., 2009). 
These rigid strategies may prevent successful behaviour change in treatment - even in 
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motivated patients (Tchanturia, Serpella, Troop, & Treasure, 2001). Thus, a model of 
psychological (in)flexibility has been proposed and advocated for as a treatment target 
(Merwin et al., 2010).  
A deficit in the aspect of set-shifting, in particular, has been noted (Easter & 
Tchanturia, 2011; McAnarney et al., 2011; Roberts, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2010; 
Steinglass, Walsh, & Stern, 2006; Tchanturia, Morris et al., 2004). Set-shifting refers to the 
ability of cognitively shifting between mental tasks, responses, or sets. It requires the 
inhibition or adaptation of previous thinking patterns and is vital for behavioural flexibility, 
in which a person is required to adapt their behaviour to the ever-changing demands of the 
external environment (Wilson, 2004). A meta-analysis in 2007 further asserted that 
individuals with AN demonstrated suboptimal performance in set-shifting compared to 
controls (Roberts, Tchanturia, Stahl, Southgate, & Treasure, 2007). These deficits have been 
established in various laboratory tasks (e.g. Fassino et al., 2002; Lauer, 2002; Tchanturia, 
Morris et al., 2004; Tchanturia, Serpell, Troop, & Treasure, 2001) and possible 
neuropsychological correlates have been identified (Nakazato et al., 2010; Nakazato et al., 
2009). Indeed, various studies have suggested problems in set-shifting to be an 
endophenotypic trait of individuals with AN (Holliday, Tchanturia, Landau, Collier, & 
Treasure, 2005; Roberts et al., 2007; Southgate, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2005; Tchanturia, 
Morris et al., 2004; Tenconi et al., 2010). Even once recovered, those with a history of AN, 
still show deficits in set-shifting (Tchanturia, Morris et al., 2004). Furthermore, familial 
evidence of set-shifting deficits have been reported (Holliday et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 
2010). Collaboratively, studies suggest that cognitive inflexibility is a risk factor (Holliday et 
al., 2005) as well as a maintenance factor (Schmidt & Treasure, 2006; Steinglass et al., 2006) 
for AN. 
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Taken together, these factors come together to characterise a toxic way of thinking, 
the CAS. As the CAS is derived from an individual‟s metacognitive beliefs that become 
activated in problematic situations, maladaptive metacognitive beliefs must be modified in 
order to remove the CAS. 
 
Metacognitions 
Metacognitions answers the question of what controls one‟s thoughts. In other words, 
metacognitions determine whether our thoughts are dismissed or whether they are dwelled 
upon, potentially leading to prolonged and deeper distress if the latter approach is selected. 
Wells (2009b) points out that “metacognitions are responsible for healthy and unhealthy 
control of the mind (p.1)”. Emphasis lies not with the thought content, but rather with the 
thought patterns: instead of focusing on what a person thinks, the focus rests on how that 
person thinks. This „how’ establishes felt emotions and the control one has over them. 
Metacognitions are divided into three aspects: knowledge and beliefs; experiences; and 
strategies. These three aspects are by no means independent but function together as an 
integrated whole (Wells, 1995, 2008, 2009a). The three metacognitive aspects are looked at 
in turn. 
Metacognitive Knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge refers to the theories and beliefs 
one has about one‟s own thinking. This knowledge consists of beliefs about different 
thoughts but also about a person‟s power of concentration and memory efficiency. 
Metacognitive knowledge can be split into two different types: explicit and implicit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be verbally expressed, as in the thought “Worrying is 
dangerous and uncontrollable”. Implicit knowledge on the other hand cannot usually be 
expressed verbally. Rather, implicit knowledge acts as rules that guide a person‟s thinking. 
Examples include the allocation of attention, the use of heuristics when forming judgements, 
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and searching through memories. Alongside these two aspects of metacognitive knowledge, 
there are a further two content domains: positive and negative metacognitive beliefs (more 
details below). Positive beliefs refer to the advantages of engaging in cognitive activities, 
which may pertain to ineffective coping strategies, such as rumination. Negative 
metacognitive beliefs are concerned with the uncontrollability, importance, dangerousness, 
and pessimistic meaning of thoughts (Wells, 1995, 2008, 2009a). 
Metacognitive Experiences. Metacognitive experiences are feelings and situational 
appraisals  individuals have of their mental status (Wells, 2009a). Metacognitive experiences 
include: subjective feelings, such as the tip of the tongue effect; and appraisals or judgements 
of the meaning of particular thoughts or events. In other words, metacognitive experiences 
are a conscious interpretation and labelling of cognitive experiences (Wells, 1995, 2008, 
2009a). 
Metacognitive Strategies. Lastly, metacognitive strategies are specific responses that 
are performed to control and alter thinking with the ultimate goal being cognitive and 
emotional self-regulation. Depending on which strategy is selected, cognitive activity is 
modified, intensified, or suppressed. A number of strategies are aimed at reducing negative 
emotions or thoughts by altering cognitions, while other strategies utilize distraction, positive 
thinking, and suppression. In psychopathology, the strategies employed by individuals are 
usually attempts to control the nature of their thinking. These include suppression, avoidance, 
rumination, and predicting the future. Unfortunately, these strategies have been found to be 
counterproductive in the long term (Wells, 1995, 2008, 2009a). 
 
Positive and Negative Metacognitions 
As mentioned, metacognitions encompass two different poles: positive and negative 
metacognitions. Positive metacogntions are concerned with the usefulness of strategies, such 
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as threat monitoring, worry, or rumination. These beliefs may appear reasonable at first. By 
catastrophizing, an internal sense of being able to effectively deal with the range of possible 
threats that arise may be harboured. Such beliefs, however, become maladaptive in the long-
run and prolong the CAS by using up valuable processing resources, prolonging self-focused 
processing, and by disrupting or biasing other processes, such as emotional processing. In the 
same vein, negative metacognitions exacerbate the CAS. These negative metacognitions refer 
to the negative meaning and significance of internal cognitive events: the uncontrollability of 
thoughts, as well as the importance and danger of these thoughts. The CAS persists because 
negative metacognitive beliefs lead to negative and threatening interpretations of internal 
events, and because of a lack of attempting control (Wells, 2000, 2009b). 
 Taken together, metacognitions are present in every person‟s thought process - 
consciously and unconsciously. However, some individuals with certain psychiatric disorders 
appear to display different metacognitions compared to individuals without disorders. These 
may include pervasive, ruminative thinking styles, active worrying, and inapt attentional 
priorities that fail to neutralize or modify maladaptive thoughts and beliefs (Wells, 1995, 
2008, 2009a).  
 
Metacognitive Research across Disorders 
Research on metacognitions in relation to psychopathology appears to have expanded 
considerably within the last decade when conducting a literature search. Numerous studies 
exist around metacognitions and the maintenance of generalized anxiety disorder (Wells, 
1995, 1999), for which the metacognitive model was originally designed. These studies were 
able to conceptualize the aetiology and the maintaining metacognitive factors of GAD: Type 
I worry focuses on the content of the worries, and Type II worry, worrying about worry, is 
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termed meta-worry. Meta-worry is the mechanism responsible for creating psychopathology 
from common unpathological worrying (Wells, 1995). 
Various other studies have also shown a causal or cross-sectional relationship 
between metacognitive dimensions and psychopathology. For instance, authors studying 
Schizophrenia argue that a deficit in metacognition, that is, difficulties with thinking about 
thinking, leads to functional impairment in individuals suffering from Schizophrenia 
(Lysaker et al., 2010; Lysaker et al., 2011). The same has been found in other psychotic 
disorders (Morrison & Wells, 2003). 
In individuals who abuse substances, metacognitions appear to mediate substance use 
and may create a barrier for treatment (Toneatto, 1999). It was found that individuals 
dependent on alcohol scored higher than controls on positive and negative beliefs about 
emotional and cognitive self-regulation, negative beliefs about uncontrollability and negative 
beliefs about cognitive harm (Spada & Wells, 2010). Overall, there appeared to be a strong 
link between metacognitive factors and problem drinking (Spada, Moneta, & Wells, 2007; 
Spada & Wells, 2005, 2006; Spada, Zandvoort, & Wells, 2007). 
A study on problem gambling and metacognition asserted that the metacognitive 
constructs of positive and negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of thoughts 
were vital to the maintenance of problem gambling (Lindberg, Fernie, & Spada, 2011).  
Metacognitive aspects are implicated in many other psychopathologies, such as 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (García-Montesa et al., 2006; Hermans, Martens, De Cort, 
Pieters, & Eele, 2003; Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, & Heffelfinger, 2003; Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1998), post-traumatic stress disorder (Roussis & Wells, 2006; Vassiliki, 
Nicholas, & Wells, 2001), hypochondriasis (Bouman & Meijer, 1999), and depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Wells, 2009b). 
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Non-clinical samples and metacognitions have also been investigated and a positive 
relationship was found. These studies included individuals undergoing stress and negative 
emotionality (Spada, Nikĉević, Moneta, & Wells, 2008), procrastination (Spada, Hiou, & 
Nikcevic, 2006), test anxiety (G. Matthews, Hillyard, & Campbell, 1999; Spada, Nikcevic, 
Moneta, & Iresond, 2006), and smoking behaviour (Spada, Nikĉević, Moneta, & Wells, 
2007). 
 
Metacognitive Research in AN 
Following a detailed search, few sources examining metacognitions in AN patients 
were identified.  Some earlier studies, whether intentionally or not, examined individual 
aspects of metacognitions in eating disorder samples. For instance, at the time the DSM-III 
was in use, Clark, Feldman, and Channon (1989) carried out early research looking at 
dysfunctional thinking in women diagnosed with an eating disorder. Although the authors‟ 
aim was to investigate the nature of negative cognitions in eating disorders, self-report 
questionnaires additionally inquired about the controllability and the beliefs participants 
possessed about their negative thoughts related to their eating disorder.  Controllability and 
beliefs about thoughts are two aspects that are descriptive of and of interest in metacognitive 
research. After controlling for frequency of negative thoughts, those with eating disorders 
reported, among other things, that they believed their thoughts to be more realistic and more 
uncontrollable than controls. This early study, therefore, suggested the presence of significant 
differences in the internal dialogue of women with an eating disorder compared to women 
without an eating disorder. Such research demonstrates the relevance of metacognitions in 
Eating Disorders in general; however, it appears that research relating to metacognitions and 
AN has been overlooked and is only just starting to accumulate.  
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In 2002, Turner and Cooper aimed to look at cognitions in individuals with eating 
disorders, yet also incorporated  questions that were metacognitive in nature. Results showed 
that those with AN, besides having more cognitions about eating, shape, and weight, also 
reported more negative assumptions related to self acceptance and acceptance by others. AN 
patients tended to consider these beliefs to be more true, more distressing, and displayed 
more negative self-beliefs as well as more assumptions relating to uncontrollability of eating 
and over-eating. These results were, thus, suggestive of significant differences in cognitive 
characteristics between the three groups; findings that aligned with Clark, Feldman, and 
Channon‟s study (1989) 13 years prior. 
In 2007, Cooper, Grocutt, Deepak, and Bailey conducted a preliminary study 
examining the presence of metacognitions in women with a history of AN. Compared to both 
control groups, women with a history of AN scored higher on the metacognitive 
questionnaires. Scores of uncontrollability and danger; need for control; cognitive 
confidence; and cognitive self-consciousness were elevated, indicating that four out of the 
five metacognitive constructs were significantly higher in the AN group. One exception 
pertained to levels of positive beliefs about metacognitions. This construct was not 
significantly different between samples. Furthermore, no significant difference in scores of 
dieting and non-dieting participants was found in terms of levels of metacognitions, revealing 
these elevations to be exclusive to women with a history of AN. This study seems to be one 
of the first of its kind to directly assess metacognitions in eating disorders and showed that 
the topic clearly warranted further study.  
Indeed, a year later, building on these findings, Woolrich, Myra, Cooper, and Turner 
(2008) conducted another preliminary study analysing a similar sample group. Findings 
appeared to suggest that although metacognitive appraisals and control strategies were 
present in all three samples, those with AN exclusively tended to believe that their thoughts 
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were uncontrollable and abnormal. Moreover, those with AN used metacognitive control 
strategies significantly more often but were unfortunately less successful at attending to their 
bodies, attending to others, and using thought reappraisal. Interestingly, half of the AN group 
reported utilizing such strategies to deliberately feel worse about themselves. This strategy 
perhaps acted as a motivator or used due to particular benefits metacognitions were believed 
to bring. The advantages and disadvantages individuals with AN endorsed about their 
thoughts were directly addressed in this study through qualitative questionnaires. Woolrich, 
et al. (2008), hence, suggested that metacognitions may play a role in AN, particularly in its 
maintenance by reinforcing negative self evaluations. 
A more recent study by Konstantellou and Reynolds (2010) investigated both the 
aspect of metacognitions and intolerance of uncertainty, comparing a non-clinical sample of 
individuals with normal and problematic eating attitudes. Results indicated that those with 
problematic eating attitudes showed elevated scores on three of the five metacognitive 
factors, the total metacognition score, as well as intolerance of uncertainty. Furthermore, the 
authors found a positive correlation between metacognitions and intolerance of uncertainty. 
Findings suggested that intolerance of uncertainty and metacogntions played a vital role in 
Eating Disorders and seemed to indicate a maladaptive cognitive style. Thus, both appear 
worth targeting in treatment interventions. 
In 2011, McDermott and Rushford published a succinct study measuring 
dysfunctional metacognitions in women with AN compared to women in a control group. 
Findings from self-report questionnaires indicated that women with AN reported a higher 
score on metacognitive dysfunction: four out of five metacognitive constructs were 
significantly elevated compared to the control group. These findings appear to be consistent 
with Cooper et al (2007), who also found all but „positive beliefs about worry‟ to be elevated. 
McDermott and Rushford‟s (2011) study adds to the literature that metacognitive dysfunction 
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may be a considerable factor in the maintenance of AN; hence metacognitions may be an 
effective treatment target. 
Overall, almost all metacognitive studies relating to AN found increased scores on at 
least three, if not four of the five metacognitive constructs: need for control, cognitive 
confidence, cognitive self consciousness, and negative beliefs about uncontrollability and 
danger of worry. This study expanded on this research by adding other related measures 
looking at rumination and reflection; positive and negative beliefs about rumination; thought 
control; depression, and anxiety. Moreover, qualitative questions were completed by 
participants for a more in-depth review examining relevant metacognitive themes. 
 
Measuring Metacognitions 
In order to measure metacogntions in this study, the Metacognitive Questionnaire 30 
(MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) and the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; 
Wells & Davies, 1994) were utilized. These questionnaires measure the following 
metacognitive aspects: positive beliefs about worry (MCQ-30); negative beliefs about 
uncontrollability and danger of worry (MCQ-30); cognitive confidence (MCQ-30); need for 
control (MCQ-30); cognitive self-consciousness (MCQ-30); distraction (TCQ); punishment 
(TCQ); reappraisal (TCQ); worry (TCQ); and social control (TCQ). Each of these aspects is 
briefly explained below. 
The MCQ-30 contains five measurable aspects. (1) Positive beliefs about worry 
measures the degree to which a person believes worry or a perseverative thinking style is 
useful, helps to solve problems, or helps to avoid unpleasant situations . The measure also 
encompasses items examining the degree to which a person believes that worrying is a 
necessary trait of a normal/pleasant person. (2) Negative beliefs about uncontrollability and 
danger of worry measures the extent to which a person believes worry or a perseverative 
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thinking style to be uncontrollable and mentally or physically dangerous. A person scoring 
high on this facet believes that a prerequisite to function well as a person is to be able to 
control one‟s worrying. (3) Cognitive confidence refers to having confidence in one‟s own 
cognitive skills, namely attentional functioning, memory, and reality monitoring. (4) Need for 
control measures the extent to which a person believes that aversive consequences will occur 
if a thought is not controlled; therefore, certain thoughts must be suppressed. A person high 
on this aspect holds negative beliefs about thoughts in general and may embody themes 
around superstition, responsibility, or punishment. (5) Cognitive self-consciousness measures 
a person‟s tendency to monitor thoughts and focus on internal thinking processes 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). 
The Thought Control Questionnaire also contains 5 measurable aspects. These are (1) 
Worry, in which perseverative thinking is utilized to attempt to control thoughts, e.g., “I 
dwell on other worries”. (2) Punishment is used in order to control a thought through an 
aversive stimuli on the self, e.g. pinching, swearing, hitting (Ree, 2010). Both worry and 
punishment embody maladaptive control strategies and are associated with a predisposition to 
psychopathology (Wells & Davies, 1994). (3) Both behavioural and cognitive distraction is 
used to distract from a thought an individual does not wish to think about e.g., “I think 
pleasant thoughts instead”. (4) Reappraisal challenges the validity of an unwanted thought 
(Ree, 2010). (5) Social control utilizes reassurance from others, e.g., “I ask my friends if they 
have similar thoughts”. Distraction, reappraisal, and social control appear to be markers of 
positive psychological health markers. They may, under some circumstances, buffer against 
emotional vulnerability (Wells, 2000; Wells & Davies, 1994). 
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Study Hypotheses 
Following on from the metacognitive research, the hypotheses for this study are as follows: 
1. The AN group will display a higher frequency of metacognitions than the dieting and 
non-dieting group. Specifically, four of the metacognitive factors on the MCQ-30 
(„need for control‟, „cognitive confidence‟, „cognitive self consciousness‟, and 
„negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of worry‟) will be significantly 
elevated in the AN group compared to the dieting and non-dieting group. It is 
expected that the fifth factors of „positive beliefs about worry‟ will not be different 
across the groups. 
2. It is expected that there will be a positive correlation between metacognitions and 
rumination, and metacognitions and worry in all three group, as suggested in the 
literature. 
3. The AN group will display more negative metacognitive control strategies than the 
dieting and non-dieting group, as measured by the TCQ. 
4. Anxiety and depression will not have a significant effect on the metacognitive 
findings across the three groups.   
5. As qualitative data on metacognitions and AN is lacking, the qualitative data will be 
analysed inductively, as opposed to inspected via hypothesis-testing.    
 
Summary 
Reviewing the existing literature in relation to metacognitions and AN, it becomes 
clear that more research on this topic is vital for a new or additional conceptualization of AN. 
AN is a chronic, debilitating psychiatric illness, for which no efficacious treatment is 
currently available, despite its seriousness. Although CBT is often used to treat adult women 
with AN, support for this treatment type is very limited; hence, the search for alternative 
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treatments is needed. The answer may lie with targeting dysfunctional metacognitions instead 
of merely targeting dysfunctional cognitions. Metacognitions are cognitive factors 
monitoring, interpreting, and controlling thinking, or to state is simply: thinking about 
thinking (Wells, 2009a). The importance of both positive and negative metacognitions has 
been identified in psychological disorders (e.g. Dimaggio et al., 2011; García-Montesa et al., 
2006; Lysaker et al., 2010; Wells, 2000), particularly in GAD (Wells, 1995, 2008, 2009b). 
Preliminary studies show a potential value of targeting metacognitions in eating disorders 
(Cooper et al., 2007; Konstantellou & Reynolds, 2010; McDermott & Rushford, 2011; 
Woolrich et al., 2008) and this thesis build on these novel findings. 
This study aims to examine the frequency and nature of metacognitions across women 
dieting, not dieting, and with a diagnosis of AN. The Self-regulatory executive function (S-
REF) model represents the underlying metacognitive model  and serves to provide an 
explanatory framework of how metacognitive dysfunction can lead to general 
psychopathology, or in this case, AN. At the core of the S-REF model is a particularly toxic 
thinking style: the CAS. This study examines whether the S-REF embodies a valid model that 
can explain how AN is developed and/or maintained. 
This research aims to fill some of the gaps and battle some of the limitations of 
previous studies. Firstly, a larger sample compared to earlier studies will be recruited so as to 
make the findings more generalisable and representative of the population. Secondly, this 
study will be controlling for anxiety and depression, in order to rule out symptoms and 
metacognitions not related to AN. Thirdly, qualitative analysis will expand on the 
quantitative analysis by identifying the specific advantages and disadvantages of having 
worried or anxious thoughts about shape, weight, and eating across the three sample groups.  
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Method 
The purpose of the study was to examine the nature and extent of metacognitions in 
relation to weight, shape, and eating in a sample of female university students currently not 
dieting, dieting, and in adult females diagnosed with AN.  
Participants 
Three groups of participants were recruited: non-dieting female students, dieting 
female students, and female AN patients. While non-dieters acted as the first control group, 
non-dieters were included in the study as a second control group. Dieters share various 
concerns typical of individuals with an ED, and it was considered important to determine 
whether both groups displayed similar scores on relevant measures. 
The first group included 60 non-dieting adult females, without a history of eating 
disorder behaviours or current psychiatric disorders. The mean age of women in this group 
was 21.38 (SD = 5.87). The mean BMI was 22.37 (SD = 3.93). 
The second group comprised 55 non-symptomatic adult female dieters who followed 
a standard weight reduction diet and set strict rules about their eating over the previous four 
weeks or more. Women with current or historic eating disorders or psychiatric disorders were 
excluded. The mean age for this group was 23.44 (SD = 8.06). The mean BMI was 23.78 (SD 
= 4.30) 
The third group consisted of 16 female inpatients and outpatients from the South 
Island Eating Disorder Services (SIEDS), New Zealand with a primary diagnosis of AN. 
These women were initially approached about the study by their case managers, and 
consequently contacted by the researchers. The mean age for this group was 24.0 (SD = 6.00) 
and the mean BMI was 17.24 (1.93). 
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Data Collection Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Upper South A Regional Ethics Committee. 
Refer to Appendix A. 
University student participants were recruited in three ways: via emails; via flyers 
(See Appendix B) that were pinned on notice boards around the University; and via a first 
year psychology student participant pool, in which course credit was granted upon study 
participation. Each recruitment procedure included information about the nature of this study 
and its inclusion criteria. Dieting and non-dieting female participants were to be at least 18 
years of age, fluent in the English language, have no current diagnosis of a mental disorder, 
nor a previous eating disorder diagnosis of less than five years. 
Patients with AN were recruited via their case manager, who initially informed them 
about the study. Patients displaying interest were subsequently followed up via email or their 
case manager. During initial contact with participants, an exclusion criteria screening was 
performed. AN participants were to be at least 18 years of age, diagnosed with current AN, 
and fluent in the English language. A suitable time was subsequently set up for the 
participants to complete the questionnaires at the SIEDS, and for University students to fill 
out questionnaires at the University.  
Prior to study participation, each participant received an information sheet (See 
Appendix C) with detailed information about the study and its procedure, and a consent form 
(See Appendix D) to sign as a prerequisite for study participation. Upon completion, each 
participant either received a reimbursement Countdown supermarket voucher or course 
credit. University students were given these at the researchers‟ office; patients with AN 
received these at the SIEDS. 
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Materials  
Nine questionnaires were used in this study. Alongside this, six qualitative questions 
were asked. 
The Metacognitive Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30).The Metacognitive Questionnaire-30 
(MCQ-30; Wells and Cartwright-Hatton 2004) is a 30 question self-report measure, derived 
from the 65-item MCQ (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), concerned with beliefs people 
have about their thinking. The MCQ-30 assesses five factors of metacognitions. These 
include cognitive confidence (e.g. „„I do not trust my memory‟‟), cognitive self-consciousness 
(e.g. “I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts”), need to control thoughts (e.g. 
„„My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try to stop them‟‟), positive beliefs about 
worry (e.g. „„Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind‟‟), and negative beliefs 
about worry (e.g. „„It is bad to think certain thoughts”). Answers are indicated on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = Do not agree to 4 = Agree very much). This multidimensional instrument is 
well documented, has a factor structure that is consistent with the original scale, and 
possesses good psychometric properties. Alpha coefficients range from .72 to .93, and MCQ-
30 subscales were positively correlated with trait anxiety and pathological worry. No gender 
differences were found. 
The Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS) (See Appendix E).The Positive 
Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou & Wells 2001a) is a nine-item scale 
that assesses positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination (e.g. “Ruminating about my 
feelings helps me to understand past mistakes and failures”). Answers are indicated on a 4-
point Likert scale (1 = Do not agree to 4 = Agree very much) and total scores range from 9 to 
36. Psychometric analysis shows a one factor solution, alongside good psychometric validity 
and reliability. The internal consistency produced an alpha of .89 and test-retest stability over 
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a 6-week interval indicated a score of .85. The PBRS shows meaningful associations with 
other self-report scales measuring positive beliefs about worry, anxiety, rumination, and 
depression. Furthermore, the PBRS is able to effectively distinguish patients suffering from 
recurrent depression from patients with other disorders, such as social phobia, agoraphobia, 
and panic attacks. 
The Negative Beliefs about Rumination (NBRS) (See Appendix F). The Negative 
Beliefs about Rumination Scale (NBRS; Papageorgiou and Wells 2001b) is a 13-item 
questionnaire measuring two types of negative metacognitive beliefs, indicating a two factor 
solution. The first is regarding the harmfulness and uncontrollability of rumination (e.g., 
„„Rumination about my problems is uncontrollable‟‟), while the second concerns itself with 
the social and interpersonal consequences of rumination (e.g. „„People will reject me if I 
ruminate‟‟). Answers are indicated on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Do not agree to 4 = Agree 
very much) with total scores ranging from 13 to 52. Internal consistency for harmfulness and 
uncontrollability, and consequences of rumination demonstrate .80 and .83 respectively. Test-
retest stability is acceptable. Meaningful associations were found between the NBRS and 
indices of negative beliefs about worry, rumination, and depressive symptoms in other 
measures. The NBRS is further able to discriminate between patients with depression and 
patients with other disorders, such as social phobia, panic disorder, and agoraphobia.   
Thought control questionnaire. The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & 
Davies, 1994) is a 30-item self-report measure, marked on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = never to 
4 = almost always). It examines various techniques employed by individuals to control 
unpleasant or unwanted thoughts. These include cognitive and behavioural distraction (e.g. “I 
think pleasant thoughts instead” and “I do something that I enjoy”), social control (e.g. “I 
don’t talk about the thought to anyone”), worry (e.g. “I think about past worries”), 
punishment (e.g. “I punish myself for thinking the thought”), and re-appraisal (e.g. “I 
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logically reason it out”). Good validity and reliability is reported. Internal consistency ranges 
from .64 to .79, with low correlation coefficients, indicating that the subscales measure 
empirically distinct constructs. Test-retest coefficients range from .67 to .83. No gender 
differences were detected. 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (See Appendix G). The Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) was designed to 
assess trait symptoms of pathological worry. This measure evaluates the tendency to worry, 
the intensity of worry, the uncontrollability of worry, and the generalisability of worry. The 
PSWQ contains 16 items, which are rated from 1 = not at all typical to 5 = very typical. Total 
scores range from 16 to 80. The PSWQ demonstrates a high degree of internal consistency, 
ranging from .89 to .93 for anxiety disorder patients, and from .91 to .95 for community 
samples. Test-retest reliability proved to be good and ranged from .75 over a 2-week interval 
to .92 over an 8-10 week interval. Convergent validity also appeared to be good. The PSWQ 
was moderately to highly correlated with other questionnaires measuring worry, such as the 
Worry Scales Questionnaire (r=.59) and the Student Worry Scale (r=.67). 
The Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ) (See Appendix H). The 
Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) is a 24-item subscale 
measuring self-attentiveness and its reasons. Rumination measures self-attentiveness that is 
motivated by injustices to the self or by perceived threats or losses (e.g. “I don’t waste time 
rethinking things that are over and done with”), while reflection measures self-attentiveness 
that is motivated by interest in the self or by curiosity (e.g. “Sometimes it is hard for me to 
shut off thoughts about myself”). Answers about the extent of an individual‟s rumination and 
reflection traits are marked on a 5-point Likert Scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree). Total scores range from twelve (low rumination) to 60 (high rumination). The 
reliability is very good (α=.90 and .91) with a mean inter-item correlation of .48 for 
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rumination and .43 for reflection. The RRQ‟s validity is supported by correlations with 
instruments measuring self-consciousness, depression, anxiety, negative autobiographical 
memories, neuroticism, and negative affect. 
The Eating Disorder Examination- Questionnaire-4 (EDE-Q4) (See Appendix I). The 
Eating Disorder Examination- Questionnaire-4 (Fairburn & Beglin, 1994) is a 38 item self-
report questionnaire derived from the semi-structured EDE interview. The EDE-Q4 uses a 7-
point Likert Scale ranging from 0 = no days to 7 = every day and encompasses four 
subscales. These include restraint (e.g. “Have you been deliberately trying to limit the amount 
of food you eat to influence your shape or weight?“), eating concerns (e.g. “Have you had 
episodes of binge eating?”), shape concerns (e.g. “Have you definitely wanted your stomach 
to be flat?”), and weight concerns (e.g. “Have you had a definite fear that you might gain 
weight or become fat?”); allowing for a Global Score when all four subscales are examined in 
combination. Participants fill out the frequency of engaging in eating disordered behavior 
over a four week timeframe. The EDE-Q4 has similarly good validity (r=.9- to 95) and 
reliability (α=.68 to .9) when compared to the EDE interview. A study using the EDE-Q4 
among undergraduate women (Mond, et al., 2004) found internal consistencies ranging from 
.78 to .93 and test-retest correlations for the four subscales ranged from .81 to .84. 
The Eating Attitudes Test-26 (EAT-26) (See Appendix J). The Eating Attitudes Test 
(Garner and Garfunkel, 1979) is a 26-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess a 
range of attitudes and behaviours present in AN and BN.  The EAT-26 is an adaptation from 
its original 40-item version. Answers are marked on a 6-point Likert Scale ranging from 
Always to Never with total scores ranging from 0 to 72.  Three subscales are measured and 
include Dieting (relating to avoidance of fattening foods and the preoccupation with being 
thinner, e.g. “Engage in dieting behavior”), Bulimia and Food Preoccupation (relating to 
thoughts about food and indications of bulimia, e.g. “Aware of the calorie content of foods 
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that I eat”), and Oral Control (relating to self-control of eating and perceived pressure from 
others to gain weight, e.g. “Vomit after I have eaten”). The EAT-26 displays good reliability 
and validity (Garner, et al., 1982). Internal consistency shows α = .90 and a validity 
coefficient of .85. The EAT-26 possesses an accuracy rate of at least 90% in separating 
individuals with and without eating disorders, using DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. 
Additionally, the EAT-26 is able to differentiate among eating disordered, symptomatic, and 
asymptomatic patients. 
The Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS) (See Appendix K). The 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a three subscaled, 42-
itemed self-report questionnaire, providing a highly discriminant measure of depression (e.g. 
“I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all”) and anxiety (e.g. “I felt I was close 
to panic). It examines the unique and unrelated aspects of these two disorders and also 
incorporates stress (e.g. “I found it difficult to relax”); a feature common to both depression 
and anxiety. Participants rate their answers on a scale ranging from 0 = did not apply to me at 
all to 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the time. Validity and reliability were found to 
be good (Akin & Çetïn, 2007). Internal consistencies for depression, anxiety, and stress were 
.96, .89, and .93 respectively. Convergent validity was found to be highly correlated with the 
Beck Depression Inventory (.74) as well as the Beck Anxiety Inventory (.81). Test-retest 
reliability amounted to .48. 
Along with general demographics questions (See Appendix L), participants were 
asked qualitative questions assessing metacognitions: 
1) What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your eating? 
2) What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your 
eating? 
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3) What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your weight? 
4) What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your 
weight? 
5) What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your shape? 
6) What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your 
shape? 
 
Data Analyses 
Participants‟ responses were scored and both quantitative and qualitative analyses 
were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software. Descriptive statistics were used to 
compare the groups across variables.  
For the quantitative data, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to 
compare the frequency of metacogntions across the samples. Bivariate correlation was 
performed to determine the nature of the correlation between metacognitions and rumination, 
and metacognitions and worry. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was also performed to 
control for anxiety and depression, so as to establish whether these variables have a 
significant effect on the nature of metacognitive processes. Overall, the incidence of missing 
data was less than 1% (0.763%). Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation 
of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. No such violations were 
found.  
Qualitative analysis was carried out using thematic analysis, which included 
identifying a limited number of themes that adequately reflected textual data. Participant 
answers across all groups were recorded on pieces of paper according to the question 
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answered so all answers could be examined together for each question. Commonalities 
became apparent while looking across answers in all three groups. Subjective themes were 
generated independently by both the author and another researcher and recorded. Each 
researcher created her own themes that made sense to her in relation to the data. Both 
generated sets of themes were then compared and combined in a way that best covered all 
qualitative answers. As one researcher generated more numerous and specific themes and the 
other fewer and more general themes, a middle ground was reached and used for thematic 
analysis. Data was then coded simultaneously by both researchers to ensure agreement on 
answers and themes and to increase reliability. Descriptive statistics were used to determine 
the frequency of themes in participants‟ answers in the three groups. A one-way ANOVA 
was used to identify any significant differences in metacognitive themes between the three 
groups. 
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Results 
This section will firstly outline the quantitative results, examining descriptive 
statistics, one-way ANOVAs, and correlation analyses. Secondly, the qualitative analyses 
will be described, including themes and theme frequencies. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Table 1 presents the demographic variables for all three groups. Results indicate that 
there were no statistically significant differences between any of the three samples in terms of 
age, education, ethnicity, or marital status. 
Table 1 
Demographic Variables of Age, Education, Ethnicity and Marital Status in Non-Dieting 
Women, Dieting Women, and Women with Anorexia Nervosa 
 Non-Dieting Dieting Anorexia Nervosa p= 
 M (SD) % (N) M (SD) % (N) M (SD) % (N)  
Years 
Age  
 
21.38 (5.87) 
  
23.44 (8.06)  
  
24.0 (6.00) 
  
0.19 
High School   4.83 (0.56)  4.84 (0.43)  4.94 (0.25)  0.73 
University 1.60 (2.13)  1.56 (1.84)  1.67 (1.61)  0.98 
Tertiary Ed 0.20 (0.54)  0.26 (0.59)  0.19 (0.40)  0.80 
 
Ethnicity 
       
0.28 
NZ Euro  68.3 (41)  63.6 (35)  100 (16)  
Maori  3.3 (2)  3.6 (2)  0 (0)  
Chinese   8.3 (5)   3.6 (2)  0 (0)  
Indian  1.7  (1)   1.8 (1)  0 (0)  
Other  13.3 (8)   12.7 (7)  0 (0)  
Multiple  5.0 (3)  14.5 (8)  0 (0)  
Marital Status       0.76 
Married  10.0 (6)  14.5 (8)  12.5 (2)  
Divorced  1.7 (1)  1.8 (1)  6.3 (1)  
Never Married  88.3 (53)  83.6 (46)  81.3 (13)  
 
As shown in Table 2, there are a variety of statistically significant differences between 
the three groups on BMI; all DASS scores; both problematic eating scales (EAT-26 and 
EDEQ-4); NBRS; RRQ Rumination subscale; PSWQ; TCQ Distraction and Punishment 
42 
 
subscales, MCQ-30 „negative beliefs about worry‟ and „need to control thoughts‟ subscales 
as well as the total MCQ-30 score. Post hoc Tukey analyses showed that the AN group‟s 
means were statistically higher compared to both the dieting and non-dieting group, with the 
exception of BMI, which was statically lower in the AN group compared to the controls. The 
few exceptions were results from the RRQ Rumination subscale and the TCQ Distraction and 
Punishment subscales, in which the AN group was statistically different only from the non-
dieting group. Results from the two problematic eating scales, demonstrated that the dieting 
and non-dieting group were also statistically different from each other, suggesting eating 
symptoms to be continuous rather than dimensional in relation to the three groups. 
Table 2 
Body Mass, Mood, Stress, Anxiety, Eating, and Metacognitive Variables measured in the 
non-dieting, dieting, and AN groups 
 Non-Dieting Dieting AN F p< 
BMI  22.37 (3.93) 23.78 ( 4.30) 17.24 (1.93) 16.34 0.00* 
DASS total 20.67 (19.03) 27.52 (23.29) 67.60 (30.18) 26.70 0.00* 
Depression 5.77 (7.13) 7.94 (8.80) 22.38 (13.16) 23.17 0.00* 
Anxiety 5.32 (5.42) 6.80 (6.53) 16.06 (9.90) 17.20 0.00* 
Stress 9.58 (8.60) 12.73 (9.75) 27.20 (10.00) 21.73 0.00* 
EAT-26 6.53 (6.90) 13.87 (11.36) 39.81 (16.29) 64.16 0.00* 
PSWQ 50.78 (13.53) 51.49 (14.00) 63.93 (8.78)) 5.80 0.00* 
PBRS 18.82 (6.94) 19.49 (6.47) 18.31 (5.72) 0.25 0.78 
NBRS 20.78 (7.45) 20.15 (6.38) 27.06 (8.55) 6.05 0.00* 
RRQ Rumination 39.47 (9.78) 14.29 (9.05) 45.81 (6.41) 3.10 0.05* 
RRQ Reflection 40.28 (9.87) 39.52 (11.16) 33.63 (6.65) 2.80 0.07 
TCQ Total 62.60 (8.60) 63.09 (7.27) 61.38 (6.82) 0.30 0.74 
Distraction 15.07 (2.83) 14.50 (2.50) 13.06 (3.07) 3.46 0.03* 
Punishment 9.20 (2.45) 9.74 (3.24) 11.63 (2.73) 4.62 0.01* 
Re-appraisal 14.12 (3.23) 14.54 (2.99) 12.44 (3.27) 2.78 0.07 
Worry 9.97 (3.14) 10.19 (3.02) 11.81 (2.86) 2.35 0.10 
Social Control 14.25 (4.50) 13.74 (4.50) 12.44 (3.54) 1.09 0.34 
MCQ Total 58.28 (12.70) 55.98 (15.97) 71.07 (16.90) 6.30 0.00* 
Positive Beliefs 11.60 (4.07) 10.84 (3.90) 13.50 (4.26) 2.74 0.07 
Negative Beliefs 11.05 (4.19) 10.91 (4.20) 16.93 (4.32) 13.29 0.00* 
Cognitive Confidence 11.10 (4.06) 11.04 (5.07) 12.44 (4.70) 0.63 0.53 
Need for Control 10.42 (3.31) 9.81 (3.95) 14.81 (4.42) 11.44 0.00* 
Cognitive Self-
consciousness 
14.12 (4.51) 13.45 (4.46) 13.31 (3.91) 0.41 0.67 
EDEQ-4 1.44 (1.23) 2.57 (1.04) 3.83 (1.17) 32.12 0.00* 
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Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stated that the AN group would display more metacognitions than 
the control groups as measured by the MCQ-30; specifically in the subscales of „need for 
control‟, „cognitive confidence‟, „cognitive self consciousness‟, and „negative beliefs about 
uncontrollability and danger of worry‟, whereas „positive beliefs about worry‟ was 
hypothesized to be similar across all groups. This hypothesis was partially supported: the AN 
group was significantly different from the dieting and non-dieting group, displaying higher 
overall metacognitive frequency (See Figure 2). Specifically, the higher frequency related to 
the subscales measuring negative metacognitions and need for control, whereas the other 
subscales were non-significant (refer to Table 2). As shown in table 2, there was a significant 
difference in the total MCQ-30 score between the three groups at the p < 0.05 level, with a 
greater mean for the AN group compared to the dieting and non-dieting groups. Despite 
reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores was quite small. The 
effect size, calculated using eta-squared was 0.09, indicating a small effect size. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the AN group 
(M=71.07, SD=16.90) was significantly larger than the dieting (M=55.98, SD=15.97) and 
non-dieting group (M=58.28, SD=12.70). Measured effect sizes were 0.17 for „negative 
beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of worry‟ and 0.15 for „need for control‟.  
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Figure 2: Mean score of the dieting, non-dieting, and AN groups on the total MCQ-30 questionnaire 
 
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA examining the NBRS and PBRS scores showed a 
significant difference between the three groups at the p<0.05 level (See Table 2). The post 
hoc Tukey analysis demonstrated a significantly higher mean in the NBRS in the AN group 
(M=27.06, SD=8.55) compared to the non-dieting (M=20.78, SD=7.45) and dieting group 
(M=20.15, SD=6.38). The PBRS results were non-significant (See Table 1).  
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis predicted a positive correlation between metacognitions and 
rumination, and metacognitions and worry in all groups. These hypotheses were partially 
supported. 
There was a strong positive correlation between rumination and metacognitions in the 
AN (r=0.52, n=15, p<0.05), dieting (r=0.63, n=54, p<0.001), and non-dieting groups (r=0.56, 
n=60, p<0.001).  
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 A different pattern was found for the three groups and worry. Specifically, no 
association was found between worry and metacognitions in the AN group, r=0.40, n=14, 
p=0.081(ns). However, a moderately strong positive correlation was found in the dieting 
group, r=0.45, n=54, p<0.001. A strong positive correlation was found between worry and 
metacognitions in the non-dieting group, r=0.672, n=59, p<0.001.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis predicted more negative metacognitive control strategies in the 
AN group compared to the dieting and non-dieting group. As can be seen in Table 2, 
ANOVA failed to show a significant result between the three groups in the total TCQ scores 
(F=0.297, p=0.744), thus this hypothesis was unsupported. However, two subscales were 
found to be significant: the „Distraction‟ and „Punishment‟ subscales (See Figures 3 and 4). 
The effect sizes, calculated using eta-squared were 0.05 for distraction and 0.07 for 
punishment, indicating medium effect sizes. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the AN group scored lower on the „Distraction‟ subscale and higher in the 
„Punishment‟ subscale than the non-dieting group. 
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Figure 3: Mean scores in the dieting, non-dieting, and AN groups on the TCQ Distraction 
subscale 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean scores in the dieting, non-dieting, and AN groups on the TCQ Punishment 
subscale  
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Hypothesis 4 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the three group results for metacognitions remain 
statistically similar when anxiety and depression were controlled for was not supported. A 
one-way between-groups analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to control for 
anxiety and depression when analysing the relationship between metacognitions and the three 
groups. The independent variable was the group type (AN, dieting, non-dieting), and the 
dependent variable consisted of the total score on the MCQ-30. Participants‟ DASS 
depression and DASS anxiety scores were used as two separate covariates in this analysis. 
Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there were no violations of the assumptions 
of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of regression slopes, and 
reliable measurement of the covariate. Significant differences were found when controlling 
for both depression and anxiety. While metacognitive findings were significant between the 
three groups without controlling for depression (F=6.788, p = <.005), they became non-
significant when controlling for depression (F=1.619, p = .204). The correlation with 
depression showed significant findings (F=2.865, p<0.001). Similarly, findings were 
significant between the three groups without controlling for anxiety (F=7.060, p<.05), but 
again became non-significant when controlling for anxiety (F=2.020, p=.137). The 
correlation with anxiety showed significant findings (F=51.924, p<0.001). 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
The thematic analysis revealed seven categories that captured the positive and 
negative metacognitions about weight, eating, and shape identified by participants in all three 
groups. The seven identified themes were: Physical health implications, emotional 
implications, social implications, practical implications, cognitive implications, diet-focused 
implications, and appearance-focused implications. Positive metacognitions were elicited by 
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asking about advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight, eating, and 
shape, while negative metacognitions were elicited by asking about disadvantages of having 
negative/anxious thoughts about weight, eating, and shape. Below are quotation examples for 
each of the themes. Each quotation is followed by the participants‟ identification numbers in 
brackets. 
Theme 1: Physical Health Implications. These metacognitions affect health behaviour, for 
example: 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that it] “stop[s] me 
from being tempted by unhealthy food” (AN7). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it] “instils a 
desire in me to not necessarily lose weight but to gain fitness, tone, and muscle while 
slimming” (D24). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that you] “try to 
achieve the shape you want through exercise and healthy eating” (D11). 
 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that] “I 
constantly feel hungry and sick” (D4). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that] “it 
becomes the only thing you care about, you lose sight of what is healthy and do 
anything to lose weight” (D14) 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that it] “make[s] 
it harder to eat all food groups in moderation” (D38). 
 
Theme 2: Affective Implications. These metacognitions affect the way you feel about 
yourself, for example: 
49 
 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that] “it allows 
you to become more aware of […] why it makes you feel a certain way. This could, in 
turn, make you stop eating foods that make you anxious” (ND28). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that you] “may be 
more open to accepting or seeking medical help if here is a problem” (ND54). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that] “I can make 
myself feel good using loose, baggy clothing” (D9). 
 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that] “it is […] 
exhausting and upsetting and leads to secondary emotions, like sadness, anger, and 
guilt” (AN13) 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it] “makes 
me self-conscious, […], makes me feel overweight” (AN9). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that you are] 
“never happy with how you are” (AN2). 
 
Theme 3: Social Implications. These metacognitions affect social interaction and social 
activities, for example: 
 An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that] “I can stop 
myself from overeating at functions and gatherings” (D17). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that]… N/A 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that]… N/A 
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 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that it] “inhibits 
[my] ability to eat out with people” (AN5). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it] “makes 
me want to isolate myself” (AN14). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that] “I don‟t like 
to try on new clothes or purchase new clothes in front of my friends” (D6). 
 
Theme 4: Practical Implications. These metacognitions have practical implications in daily 
life, affecting the way you complete daily activities, for example: 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that] “I spend less 
money at the supermarket” (D34). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it] “can 
motivate me to plan ahead so that I have the time and resources to eat healthily” 
(D38) 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that it] “saves 
money [because I] try to walk rather than taking a bus” (D61).  
 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is] “having to plan 
my food each day” (D50). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that I am] “not 
able to enjoy things that I used to” (AN10). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is] “constantly self-
checking: standing side-on in the mirror looking at stomach, checking cellulite, 
checking fluid retention” (AN8). 
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Theme 5: Cognitive Implications. These metacognitions affect the way you think about 
yourself and view things, for example: 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that you are] 
“more able to think about what you are eating; awareness” (AN6). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it makes me] 
“think about what I am eating and how this is going to affect my body” (ND6) 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that it] “gives you 
a better perception about [your] body” (D15) 
 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that it] “makes 
me indecisive and unable to make logical decisions” (AN3). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that I think] 
“that I am not worthy of having a guy or to get married” (D37) 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that you develop] 
“unrealistic views about your body image” (D46). 
 
Theme 6: Diet-focused implications. These metacognitions affect the way you think about 
dietary restriction, for example: 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that it] “defers 
overeating, binging, eating when bored/emotional” (D24). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that you are] 
“able to keep a lower weight that „normal‟” (AN5). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that] “it makes me 
want to work harder to get the body I want” (D5) 
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 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that I set] 
“punishments, such as “I won‟t eat for the rest of the day” (D26).  
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it] “makes 
me feel like I should be lighter and makes me not want to eat” (D43). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that it] “makes 
me want to lose weight” (AN9). 
 
Theme 7: Appearance focused implications. These metacognitions affect the way you think 
and feel about your appearance, for example: 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is]… N/A 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that] “it shows 
that you are taking care and pride in your appearance” (AN13). 
 [An advantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape] “allows me to 
purchase more flattering items rather than clothing that just isn‟t designed for my 
shape at all” (D52). 
 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating is that it leads to] 
“distorted body image; causes possible worsening of image state” (ND4). 
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about weight is that it makes 
me] “nervous about how I look in togs” (D50).  
 [A disadvantage of having negative/anxious thoughts about shape is that you become] 
“too attentive to makeup, clothing, etc. to compensate for anxious thoughts” (D38)  
 
A category of „other‟ was used to represent a catch-all category for themes that fell 
out of the range of generated themes.  
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Under this category, only participants in the AN group described a common subtheme 
of control as both positive and negative metacognitions. For example, in terms of positive 
metacogntions, one participant with AN wrote that an advantage of having negative/anxious 
thoughts about eating/weight/shape was that they “keep me in control of what I am eating 
[…] I am less likely to lose control of what I put into my body (AN13)”. Another participant 
indicated that they “help keep my weight under control (AN12)”. Examples of disadvantages 
of having negative/anxious thoughts about eating/weight/shape were that they lead to a 
“feeling of losing control (AN6)”. Implications regarding a sense of control were not 
identified either in the dieting or non-dieting group. 
Figure 5 displays the mean frequency of identified advantages and disadvantages of 
metacognitions in the three groups, as ascertained from the qualitative data. 
 
Figure 5: Mean frequency of identified positive and negative metacognitions in the dieting, 
non-dieting, and AN groups 
  
As can be seen in Figure 5, the AN groups displayed more total negative 
metacognitions than the dieting and non-dieting groups.  A one-way ANOVA and post-hoc 
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comparisons show significantly larger total negative metacognitive beliefs of AN participants 
(M=11.19, SD=60.15) compared to non-dieting (M=8.08, SD=4.15) and dieting participants 
(M=7.67, SD=4.03) at the p<0.05 level. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared was 
0.09, indicating a small effect size. The frequency of the total positive metacogntions 
appeared to be non-significant.  
 
 Figure 6 depicts the positive and negative metacogntions more specifically between 
groups and eating, shape, and weight. A one-way ANOVA shows a significant difference in 
the negative metacognitions in relation to eating between the three groups at the p=0.001 
level.  The post-hoc Tukey comparison suggested that the AN group identified significantly 
higher negative mean metacognitions around eating (M=4.13) than the dieting (M=2.36) and 
non-dieting (M=2.63) group. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared was 0.11., 
indicating a small effect size. Although non-significant, the other negative metacognitions 
around weight and shape show a similar trend. 
 
Figure 6: The mean number of positive and negative metacognitions about eating, shape, and 
weight between the dieting, non-dieting, and AN groups. 
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Furthermore, when looking between the groups at the different themes, significant 
differences were found, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. For metacognitive advantages, 
significant differences were found for the following themes: physical implications, social 
implications, and diet-focused implications. The post-hoc Tukey test demonstrated a significant 
differences between the non-dieting group and the other two groups for physical implications at 
the p>0.05 level. A significant difference between the dieting and non-dieting group at the p<0.01 
level for diet-focused implications and a difference for social implications between the AN group 
and the other two groups at the p<0.05 was found. 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean number of identified advantages of metacognitions in the dieting, non-dieting, 
and AN group 
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Different results were demonstrated for  indentified disadvantages of metacognitions 
between the three groups (See Figure 8). A one-way ANOVA and post-hoc Tueky test suggested 
a significant difference in appearance-focused implications, at the p<0.01 level between the 
dieting and non-dieting group, with the higher frequency indicated in the dieting group. No other 
significant differences were found, However, looking at Figure 8, a noteable trend emerges, 
showing more frequently identified negative metacognitions around emotional and cognitive 
implications in the AN group compared to the other two groups.  
 
 
Figure 8: Mean number of identified disadvantages of metacognitions in the dieting, non-dieting, 
and AN group 
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Discussion 
This thesis examined the nature and frequency of metacognitions in three different 
samples: women dieting, women not dieting, and women with a diagnosis of AN. Dieting and 
non-dieting women were recruited from the University of Canterbury, while AN participants 
were recruited from the SIEDS. Each participant completed a booklet of questionnaires and 
was reimbursed with course credit or a supermarket voucher. This study aimed to answer a 
variety of questions about the quantitative and qualitative nature of metacognitions in relation 
to AN, as well as deducing any similarities and differences compared to dieting and non-
dieting samples.  
The study revealed numerous significant differences between the groups. The first 
three hypotheses were partially supported. Hypothesis one: The AN group obtained higher 
scores in two of the five MCQ-30 subscales, instead of three to four of five, as hypothesized. 
However, the hypothesis that the factor of „positive beliefs about worry‟ would be similar 
across the groups was supported. Hypothesis two: While the hypothesis of a positive 
correlation between rumination and metacognitions across all three groups was supported, the 
hypothesis predicting a positive correlation between worry and metacognitions across all 
groups was only partially supported, as a positive correlation was not found in the AN group. 
Hypothesis three: The hypothesis was not supported, as the AN group did not display more 
negative metacognitive control strategies as evidenced by the TCQ. However, the AN group 
did display higher levels in the punishment subscale and lower levels of the distraction 
subscale of the TCQ compared to the other two groups. Each hypothesis and its related study 
findings will now be discussed in turn. Hypothesis four: The fourth hypothesis, suggesting 
that anxiety and depression would have no effect on metacognitive findings across the three 
groups, was not supported. 
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Findings: Hypothesis 1 
Analysing the nature of metacognitions between the groups yielded some important 
results. The AN group showed more metacognitions compared to the dieting and non-dieting 
group in the MCQ-30 total score, the „negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of 
worry‟ subscale, and the „need for control‟ subscale. No elevations were found in the 
„cognitive confidence‟ and „cognitive self-consciousness‟ subscales. Hence, the hypothesis of 
the AN group displaying higher MCQ-30 scores in three to four out of five subscales was not 
quite supported. The other subscales of „cognitive confidence‟ and cognitive self-
consciousness‟ were not elevated in the AN group; however, a similar elevated trend was 
observable.  The lack of association between the two subscales and the AN group may be due 
to low sample size of the AN group. 
These findings were mainly consistent with earlier studies (Cooper et al., 2007; 
McDermott & Rushford, 2011; Turner & Cooper, 2002), which showed three or four MCQ-
30 subscale elevations in the AN sample, excluding „positive beliefs about worry‟. Hence, 
results appeared to suggest that women with AN possess a higher frequency of 
metacognitions than dieting or non-dieting women, particularly when it comes to negative 
metacognitions and metacognitions around control. These findings suggest that, compared to 
controls, women with AN exhibit the CAS, which includes the aforementioned metacognitive 
components. This CAS arises from erroneous metacognitive knowledge and beliefs. Because 
of such a perseverative thinking style, typified by attentional preoccupation with threatening 
stimuli, worry, rumination, and/or unhelpful coping strategies, people become locked into a 
repetitive and prolonged pattern of negative thoughts or sensations. These negative feelings 
then become more common and permanent (Wells, 2000, 2009a).  
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The results appear to distinguish the AN sample from the non-AN sample and 
provides general support for Wells‟ S-REF model, particularly concerning dysfunctional 
beliefs about worry and maladaptive attempts at thought control. These findings contribute to 
the evidence that maladaptive metacognitions present a generic vulnerability factor for 
psychological disorders (McDermott & Rushford, 2011).  Specifically, findings indicate the 
high extent to which women with AN perceive their thoughts as uncontrollable and 
dangerous, and also how such metacognitions may characterize the psychopathology of AN.  
 
Findings: Hypothesis 2a 
As hypothesized, there was a positive association between rumination and 
metacognitions in all three groups. The results indicate that the more one ruminates, the more 
metacognitions occur, and vice versa. Similarly, when rumination decreases, so do 
metacognitions.  
Here, rumination and metacognitions were measured generally, that is, not specific to 
eating, shape, or weight. Much research has linked rumination and metacognitions, 
supporting this finding. Various authors have ascertained that beliefs about rumination‟s 
usefulness is a determinant as to whether rumination will occur, and individuals who hold a 
higher frequency of these beliefs report increased rumination (Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, 
& Kandris, 2010; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Individuals tend to associate rumination 
both negatively and positively as an effective coping strategy. This, in turn, serves to 
maintain the cycle of dysfunctional cognitions and potential psychopathology (Cowdrey & 
Park, 2011; Cowdrey & Park, 2012; Rawal et al., 2010). In reality, however, rumination 
embodies an information processing strategy that leads to maladaptive emotion regulation, 
symptom persistence, and the failure to achieve goals (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Hayes et al., 
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2004; Treynor et al., 2003). The qualitative analysis in this study also suggests that the 
frequency of positive metacognitions is very similar in all three groups, showing no 
relationship with group membership, possibly explaining the similarities regarding 
rumination in all three groups. 
 
Findings: Hypothesis 2b 
A strong association was found between worry and metacognitions in the non-dieting 
group and a moderate association was found between worry and metacognitions in the dieting 
group; however, no association between worry and metacognitions was found in the AN 
group. Hence, the hypothesis of a positive correlation between worry and metacognitions in 
all groups was not quite supported. These results appear to suggest that in the dieting and 
non-dieting groups the more one worries, the more metacognitions occur, and vice versa. 
Similarly, when worrying decreases, so do metacognitions. However, this was not found to 
be the case for the AN sample and there appears to be a distinction between individuals with 
and without AN regarding this association. 
Worry itself is a common experience in both clinical and nonclinical samples (Davey, 
1994; A. Matthews, 1990), as even in nonclinical samples, worry can lead to significant 
impairments, potentially increasing metacognitive thinking (Yılmaz, Gençöz, & Wells, 
2008). The fact that the correlation was stronger in the non-dieting sample may be explained 
by an increased use of cognitive control strategies in the dieting and AN group. Increased 
cognitive control may lead to subjective decreases in worry that become evident in self-report 
answers. Woolrich et al. (2008) suggested that individuals with AN heavily rely on 
metacognitive control strategies, for example distraction, thought suppression, and trigger 
avoidance. These study findings show a higher utilization of punishment and a lower 
61 
 
utilization of distraction in the AN group, perhaps contributing to an explanation towards 
these findings (See hypothesis three). 
A positive correlation between worry and metacognitions in the dieting group was an 
expected finding because worry represents a desirable and effective coping strategy for self 
regulation in the chronic dieting population (Wells, 2000). Indeed, interceptive cues, social 
evaluation, and food/weight related cues can trigger chronic worry states and can manifest 
themselves as hypervigilance relating to weight and shape changes. This may consequently 
lead to the cognitive misinterpretation of future threat and harm (Hildebrandt et al., 2010), 
which characterises CAS and metacogntions.  
Interestingly, the AN sample showed no such association. There may be various 
reasons for this finding. As the TCQ showed elevated punishment techniques and reduced 
distraction techniques, these may embody successful thought control strategies that could 
account for the non-existent association between worry and metacognitions in the AN group.  
Successful control strategies might diffuse the worries rather than the individual continuing to 
think about their potential meaning, and may, in turn, lead to metacognitive processes. 
Furthermore, in the AN group, worry may be more specific to eating, weight, or shape than in 
the dieting and non-dieting group. These worries, therefore, may be followed by regulatory 
actions, such as exercising or purging, to diffuse the worries.  The dieting and non-dieting 
group may alternatively use regulatory cognitive processes to manage their worries.  
In a different vein, those with AN may utilize more avoidance strategies than the 
control groups to regulate their emotional experiences. Experiential avoidance has been found 
to be a crucial factor in AN‟s underlying pathology (Lavender & Anderson, 2010; Lavender 
et al., 2011; Rawal et al., 2010). Moreover, individuals with AN endorse the idea that 
outwardly presenting negative emotions is unacceptable, possibly due to a fear of being 
criticized or rejected by others (Schmidt & Treasure, 2006). As well as this, individuals with 
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AN may have limited insight into their worry and metacognitive processes, thus accounting 
for the division between the controls and the AN group.  
Lastly, the lack of association may be an effect of the sample, as the significance of r 
is strongly influenced by sample size. Small sample sizes often obtain moderate correlations 
but do not reach statistical significance at the traditional p<0.05 level. It is plausible that this 
is the case with this finding, where r=0.40, n=14, p=0.081(ns). Indeed, the AN sample only 
reached 16 participants in this study, which is a noticeably smaller sample than the control 
groups of n=55 and n=60.  
 
Findings: Hypothesis 3 
Results between the three groups on the TCQ failed to show an association between 
the three groups in the total TCQ scores. However, two subscales were found to be different 
in the AN group: the „Distraction‟ and „Punishment‟ subscales. Specifically, the AN group 
used less distraction techniques and more punishment techniques than the dieting and non-
dieting group. Hence, the hypothesis was partially supported. There are numerous possible 
reasons as to why no differences were found in the total TCQ score between the three groups.  
 Wells and Davies (1994), the creators of the TCQ, established that thought control is a 
frequent experience in both clinical and non-clinical populations. Numerous other authors 
have also described thought control as a relatively normal phenomenon (Rachman & de 
Silva, 1987; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Wells & Morrison, 1994). Furthermore, the TCQ 
is not specific to eating, shape, or weight, but rather inquires about general unpleasant or 
unwanted thoughts. The normality of thought control strategies concerning general life 
experiences may explain the lack of differences identified between the three groups in the 
overall TCQ scores. 
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 Nonetheless, two differences between the AN group and the control groups were 
demonstrated in the results: the first showed that the AN group appeared to use less 
distraction techniques than the non-dieting group. In the literature, distraction has been 
conceptualized as potentially helpful or at least neither adaptive nor maladaptive (Wells, 
2000; Wells & Davies, 1994) but also as harmful if  it characterises suppression (Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Generally, distraction‟s helpfulness may depend on the 
type of distraction utilized, that is, whether distraction is used as an approach or as an 
avoidance strategy. A maladaptive approach appears to be „unfocused distraction‟ used in 
suppression, which in the long-term increases distressing thoughts.  In contrast, an adaptive 
approach appears to be „focused distraction‟, which employs only a limited amount of 
distracters and can reduce the frequency of distressing thoughts (Wegner et al., 1987). It may 
be the case that on the one hand, the AN group used less adaptive distraction techniques, or 
on the other hand, that the treatment the AN group were receiving at the time helped them to 
decrease unhelpful cognitive control techniques. Studies analysing the type of distraction 
used in these samples would be of benefit to the understanding of AN and the impact of 
cognitive control techniques on eating disorder symptoms.  
 The second important finding was that the AN group used more punishment 
techniques as a means of cognitive control than the non-dieting group. Wells (1994) states 
that self-punishment is a technique used by individuals to suppress unwanted thoughts and 
has been associated with general measures of psychopathology and emotional vulnerability. 
Therefore, the use of punishment to control cognition is associated with a predisposition to 
emotional difficulties, which may include AN. It may also explain the study findings and the 
reason for non-significant findings in the dieting and non-dieting group. 
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Results further suggest that the dieting group‟s scores with regards to distraction and 
punishment lie between the AN and the dieting group. This finding could suggest that there 
may be a dimensional rather than a taxonic relationship between the non-AN and AN 
population, with the dieting population perhaps manifesting the middle ground between the 
two. Indeed a review has concluded that although binge eating and possibly purging is 
taxonic, the restricting subtype of AN is continuous with normalcy (Williamson, Gleaves, & 
Stewart, 2005). These findings concerning cognitive control appear to support this.  
 
 Findings: Hypothesis 4 
When controlling for depression and anxiety in all three groups, findings appear to 
suggest that both anxiety and depression substantially contribute to the relationship between 
metacognitions and group affiliation (not dieting, dieting, AN). Thus, the hypothesis that 
group results remain similar when anxiety and depression were controlled for was not 
supported. This finding appeared to demonstrate that metacognitions cannot be predicted by 
eating behaviour independent of anxious and depressive symptoms.  
There are a variety of reasons as to why prominent emotional experiences, such as 
depression and anxiety interact with metacognitions between the three groups. Firstly, as 
previous findings of this thesis indicate, metacognitions and rumination are positively 
associated. Rumination has most notably been studied with regards to depression 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) and has been strongly implicated in its onset 
(Robinson & Alloy, 2003; Roelofs et al., 2009), its maintenance (Lara et al., 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), and its recurrence (Roberts et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 2007). It is, hence, 
understandable that the level of depression and the level of metacogntions would strongly 
correlate with one another.  
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Secondly, the CAS is characterized by feelings of low mood and anxiety. These 
emotional experiences are, thus, at the heart of the very model that generates metacognitive 
processes: the S-REF (Wells, 2000, 2009a). A close association between eating, depressive, 
and anxiety symptoms that take up metacognitive resources is, therefore, highly likely.  
Thirdly, the importance of metacognitions has been firmly established in psychiatric 
disorders, such as depression and anxiety (e.g. Dimaggio et al., 2011; García-Montesa et al., 
2006; Lysaker et al., 2010; Wells, 2000). As similar problematic metacognitions are present 
in mood, anxiety, and eating disorder patients, it can be difficult to separate out the individual 
disorders from the metacognitive processes. Additionally, there is a very high chance of 
individuals with eating disorders having a comorbid depressive or anxious disorder (DeKaye 
et al., 2004; Halmi et al., 1991; Levinson & Rodebaugh, 2012; Swinbourne et al., 2012). For 
example, anxiety disorders  are much higher in patients with AN than in controls (Pallister & 
Waller, 2008) with lifetime prevalence rates as high as 83% (Godart et al., 2000). Hence, 
GAD theories have been applied to AN. Chronic worry states, triggered by interceptive cues, 
social evaluation, and food/weight related cues can manifest themselves as hypervigilance 
relating to weight and shape changes (Hildebrandt et al., 2010). Therefore, it is probable that 
eating and emotional disorder symptoms are often overlapping. Metacognitive processes are 
most likely operating across disorder symptoms and strictly distinguishing anxious and 
depressive symptoms from an ED can at times be unfeasible and impractical. 
 
Qualitative Data 
The qualitative analysis revealed differences in metacogntions between the three 
groups. The AN group displayed more total negative metacognitions than the other two 
groups; however, there was no difference in the total positive metacognitions between the 
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groups. These findings were supported by the elevated scores found on the NBRS, but not in 
the PBRS for the AN group as well as AN group elevations found in the MCQ-30 (see Table 
2). As mentioned above, the finding that those with AN displayed more negative but not 
more positive beliefs is supported by previous studies (Cooper et al., 2007; McDermott & 
Rushford, 2011; Turner & Cooper, 2002).   
 When comparing the positive and negative metacogntions more specifically between 
groups and eating, shape, and weight, one significant difference was found: the AN group 
identified significantly higher negative metacognitions around eating than the dieting and 
non-dieting group. This may be because food and eating take on a different value for those 
with AN compared to those without AN. Indeed, neuroimaging studies have found that 
individuals with AN, as well as those who have recovered from AN, have increased neural 
responses to both aversive and rewarding food stimuli compared to controls (Brooks, O'Daly 
et al., 2011; Brooks et al., 2012; Cowdrey, Park, Harmer, & McCabe, 2011). Additionally, 
individuals with AN appear to experience pre-meal anxiety (Soussignan, T., Rigaud, Royet, 
& Schaal, 2010; Steinglass et al., 2010) and decreased pleasure to food stimuli (Toa, 
Soussignan, Rigaud, & Schaal, 2010).  Differing neuronal activity found in the above studies 
may underlie cognitive biases towards food and ruminations about cognitive control (Brooks 
et al., 2012). While non-significant, the same trend of increased frequency of negative 
metacognitions relating to weight and shape was observed in the AN group. Again, sample 
size may have hampered finding significant relationships within these variables. 
 When analysing the results yet more closely, differences were found between the 
three groups when separating out the different themes identified for positive and negative 
metacognitions. Positive metacognitive differences in relation to the themes were:  
(1) The non-dieting group identified more positive metacognitions relating to physical 
health than the other two groups. This may be because non-dieting individuals may see 
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dieting, along with exercising, as something positive to generally improve their physical 
health. Answers regarding this theme portrayed ideas of a general healthy lifestyle change or 
a loss of unwanted weight. Contrarily, dieting and AN women may see dieting in more 
restricting terms to attain their goal weight, which may not necessarily be in the healthy 
range, particularly in the AN group. Hence, differing reasons for dieting are most likely taken 
into account in each group when answering the qualitative metacognitive questions. 
Furthermore, those women not dieting were thinking of hypothetical reasons why someone 
may wish to diet. Because they represent the non-clinical control group, more sinister or 
pathological reasons for dieting may not come to mind. Metacognitions in individuals with 
psychopathology may encompass cognitive confidence, cognitive self-consciousness, need to 
control thoughts, as well as negative beliefs about worry (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), 
whereas individuals in the control group may possess differing, perhaps more „harmless‟ 
metacognitions, such as positive metacognitions regarding fitness. 
(2) The dieting group identified more positive diet-focused metacognitions than the 
non-dieting group. This makes sense, given that being on a diet will invariably yield more 
dieting thoughts than not being on a diet. Results indicate that the AN group lies somewhere 
in the middle of the two groups. Such findings could be explained by the fact that the AN 
group was undergoing treatment at the time. Thus, diet-focused metacognitions may have 
decreased as a result of treatment gains. However, as AN is a chronic illness, in which 
cognitive mechanisms are very difficult to change, these women with AN are bound to still 
be thinking heavily about their eating behaviour as well as dietary restrictions. This may lead 
them to possess less metacogntions about dietary restriction than the dieting group; however, 
still have increased metacogntions about dietary restriction that the non-dieting group. 
Furthermore, successful dieting may reduce distress caused by a negative body image. 
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Metacognitions assisting in the dieting process are, thus, valued, making these cognitive 
processes especially difficult to discontinue. 
(3) The AN group identified more socially-related metacognitions compared to the 
other two groups. Literature on sociability and AN indicates that those with AN have 
significant interpersonal problems (J. C. Carter, Kelly, & Norwood, 2012). Furthermore, 
eating is often a highly social occasion and peculiar eating habits often draw unwanted 
attention. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) describes associated descriptive features of AN to 
be social isolation, concerns about eating in public, and limited social spontaneity, supporting 
the idea that those with AN exhibit more social and interpersonal metacognitions than 
controls. This makes sense, given that social phobia is elevated in patients with AN compared 
to the non-clinical population (DeKaye, Bulik, Thornton, Barbarich, & Masters, 2004; 
Pallister & Waller, 2008). Additionally, AN is an illness that can at times be painfully 
obvious to outsiders. Unpleasant experiences of unwanted advice, awkward explanations, or 
fear of rejection and criticism can make socially related activities uncomfortable at best and 
terrifying at worst. Therefore, having increased socially-related metacognitions in the AN 
group is understandable.   
 
Negative metacognitive differences in relation to the themes were:  
(1) The dieting group identified more appearance related metacognitions than the non-
dieting group. Similar to dieting related metacognitions, it is plausible that the dieting group 
is focused more on appearance-related metacognitions, as appearance takes a huge focus 
when on a diet, particularly a restricting diet aimed at losing weight. 
(2) Although not reaching statistical elevations, a noteable trend emerged, showing more 
frequently identified negative metacognitions around emotional and cognitive implications in 
the AN group compared to controls. Again, non-statistical result may have been obtained due 
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to the smaller sample size of the AN group. Psychopathology primarily constitutes 
difficulties regulating emotions and cognitions. It makes sense that those with AN, 
particularly due to the CAS would experience a higher frequency of metacognitions relating 
to emotions and cognitions than the control groups. 
(3) One theme came through in the participants‟ answers that was only identified in the 
AN group: The theme of control, which AN participants identified as both positive and 
negative metacognitions. These findings are supported by a significant finding for the AN 
group in the „Distraction‟ and „Punishment‟ subscales of the TCQ and in the „need for 
control‟ subscale of the MCQ-30. It appears that AN mostly gives affected individuals a 
sense of control; however, at the same time it also occasionally results in a feeling of being 
controlled, or being taken over (Serpell et al., 1999). Those with AN may find metacognitive 
strategies that give them a sense of control advantageous in the short-term; however, in the 
long-term leads to the maintenance of AN, given that these thoughts lead to long-term 
constrictions  (Woolrich et al., 2008). It has been argued that the perception of 
uncontrollability in individuals with AN is a central part of AN pathology; not just related to 
disorder-specific cognitions but to AN individuals‟ thinking processes in general (Fairburn, 
Cooper, Shafran, & Wilson, 2008; McDermott & Rushford, 2011) 
Everything considered, the fact that the dieting and the AN group have heightened 
negative or anxious thoughts about eating, weight, and shape is valued by them. These 
metacognitions can act as motivators to continue to restrict eating and hence to lose weight, 
which such individuals often find desirable (Woolrich et al., 2008). It is also the reason why 
it is so different to change these thought patterns and why targeting metacognitions seems 
important. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Overall, it appears that AN women experience quantitative and some qualitative 
differences in metacognitions compared to dieting and non-dieting women; whereas there are 
few differences between dieters and non-dieters. These findings imply that metacognitions 
are fundamentally different between those with AN and those without AN.  
Taken together, the findings indicate that women with AN have a more maladaptive 
cognitive style than dieting and non-dieting women, which over time sustains psychological 
distress. This maladaptive cognitive style includes a much higher frequency of 
metacognitions; increased metacognitive themes about control and social experiences; 
increased thought control strategies concerning punishment; and decreased thought control 
strategies concerning distraction. Distorted cognitions relating to eating, shape, and weight 
may hence be preserved due to maladaptive metacognitive styles (Konstantellou & Reynolds, 
2010). Woolrich et al. (2008) found that AN patients tended to think that having negative or 
anxious thoughts about their eating, weight, or shape was evidence that their thoughts were 
dangerous or abnormal, which, in turn, reinforced their use of metacognitive control 
strategies,  as well as potentially confirming their inability to cope with such thoughts.  
The results may be able to contribute to the knowledge of whether metacognitive 
components contribute to the development or maintenance of AN, and hence, whether 
dysfunctional metacognitions are worth targeting in therapy. 
This accumulating evidence appears to suggest that Wells‟ CAS is supported for AN. 
These findings indicate that, relative to a non-clinical sample, women with AN exhibit CAS 
characterized by dysfunctional beliefs about worry and rumination, heightened attention to 
threat stimuli, unhelpful coping strategies, and a preservative thinking style. Therefore, it 
appears that Wells‟ S-REF model (Wells, 2009b) is supported: psychopathology is associated 
with the CAS and deems metacognitions as a generic vulnerability factor for 
71 
 
psychopathology. From this, tentative conclusions can be drawn. Dysfunctional, especially 
negative, metacognitions appear to perhaps contribute to the development of AN by 
representing risk factors for AN. It is also highly likely that metacognitions contribute to the 
maintenance of AN through the cyclical CAS.  
Because of the metacognitive differences compared to non-AN samples, it would 
appear that targeting dysfunctional metacognitions in psychotherapy would be beneficial.  
 
Limitations 
There are various limitations of this study, which must be acknowledged. Firstly, no 
distinction was made between healthy and unhealthy dieters. Future studies may want to 
analyse the diet plans of dieting individuals to ascertain whether their dieting behaviours 
represent problematic or non-problematic eating behaviour. This may, in turn, assist in 
predicting problematic eating attitudes. Different dieting techniques may well have a 
significant effect on study findings and may separate those dieting individuals that are more 
closely related to the AN population in terms of eating, weight, and shape attitudes, and those 
perhaps more closely related to non-dieting individuals.  Such research could give more 
insight into the AN restricting continuum. 
Secondly, there was no association between metacognitions and the three groups 
when anxiety and depression were controlled for. Therefore, more research on separating out 
or examining the different intensities of metacognitions regarding depressive, anxious, and 
eating disorder symptoms would be beneficial. Moreover, while anxiety and depression were 
controlled for, other factors remain uncontrolled but may potentially have a substantial effect 
on findings, such as comorbidity or length of treatment in the AN sample. 
Thirdly, another good practice method in such a study would be to include a 
psychiatric control group in order to compare AN with another psychiatric sample. It would 
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then be possible to detect any similarities and differences between the psychiatric samples 
and ascertain whether findings may be due to solely AN symptomatology or to 
psychopathology in general. 
Fourthly, this study is plagued by general limitations present in many research 
studies: namely the limitations of using self-report measures and the degree of 
generalizability afforded to study findings.  Self-report answers may be inaccurate due to 
exaggeration, or embarrassment of revealing private information, and hence participants may 
answer in socially desirable ways. Participants may be inaccurate in reporting some details 
due to forgetfulness and human error. As well as this, self-report measures can be biased by 
participants‟ state of mind or affect, and may have produced different answers had they been 
experiencing a different state of mind or emotion at the time (Robins, Fraley, & Krueger, 
2007). Response validity can be strengthened in future studies by additionally implementing 
implicit measures and the use of methods to improve reliability for the qualitative analysis, 
such as inter-rater reliability.  
The generalizablity of the findings may also represent another limitation. The disorder 
of AN is fortunately not overly common; however, this meant that obtaining enough willing 
participants for the study was somewhat difficult, and, hence, this study sample of AN 
participants only reached 16. Because of this small sample size it may be a stretch to be able 
to accurately generalize to the entire AN population. Establishing a large, multi-site study 
could determine if these study findings are replicable. Furthermore, the AN group sample 
was substantially smaller than the dieting and non-dieting sample; thus, the power to find 
group differences between the groups was reduced (Tchanturia, Morris et al., 2004). It may, 
hence, be possible that further changes in metacognitions may not have been detected and a 
larger sample may be needed to identify such changes. 
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Strengths 
This study also had a number of strengths. Firstly, other important differences 
between the three groups were found, which were not directly addressed via hypothesis 
testing. These findings, nevertheless, remain important and provide additional information 
that distinguishes the AN group from the dieting and non-dieting group. Statistically 
significant differences were found between the AN group and the two control groups for BMI 
and both problematic eating scales (EAT-26 and EDEQ-4). The fact that BMI was lower and 
problematic eating scales indicated higher scores for the AN group supports a true difference 
in eating attitudes and subsequent weight loss between the eating disordered and the control 
groups, making the study valid in measuring an ED sample compared to a non-ED sample.  
Secondly, the study also included numerous quantitative questionnaires, making it 
fairly thorough. Incorporated questionnaires were all standardized tests, making the study 
easily replicable. Because of its thoroughness, important variables influencing the results 
(depression and anxiety) were able to be controlled for; something that has been neglected in 
other studies. 
Lastly, this is the first study known to date that has analysed and compared qualitative 
metacognitions in AN patients, dieting, and non-dieting women. The scene has now been set 
for further investigations regarding metacognitive themes in the clinical population that may 
prove to be beneficial for psychological conceptualization and potential treatment targets. 
 
Practical and Theoretical Implications  
The findings of this study add to the knowledge pool of metacognitions in AN and 
may directly assist in clinical practice. Knowledge about metacognitions, cognitive control 
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strategies, and coping mechanisms may aid in understanding the development of AN or may 
even be indicated in early warning signs of a potentially rapidly deteriorating mental illness. 
This metacognitive research may prove to be a useful addition to research tools utilized to 
investigate metacognitions, their origin, and maintenance in eating disorders. It may aid in 
providing a possible metacognitive profile for patients with AN, which can be beneficial for 
clinical conceptualization. 
As this study found that AN patients experienced an increased frequency of 
metacogntions and a different metacognitive nature than dieting and non-dieting women, 
metacognitions concerning control and social/interpersonal factors may play an important 
role in individual patients‟ formulations and may, thus, inform treatment. With these findings 
in mind, an intervention could be implemented as a supplement to an already existing 
treatment, or as a stand-alone treatment, particularly for women who are showing limited 
success in cognitive behaviour based treatments. Clinical intervention may focus on 
challenging maladaptive metacognitive styles to decrease eating pathology. 
 
Future Directions 
Based on the qualitative analyses of metacognitive themes, a modified version of the 
MCQ-30 specifically relation to AN or EDs could be generated. This modified version could 
include a variety of negative metacognitions while excluding positive metacognitions that 
have been shown to be similar across AN and non-AN samples. Taking into account the 
qualitative data, specific themes around control and social/interpersonal factors could be 
incorporated into the questionnaire. This way, more specific and relevant information on 
metacognitions in this population could be ascertained and could potentially be used in AN 
conceptualization or treatment intervention, perhaps in the form of MCT.  Additionally, a 
small preliminary multiple baselines study could be implemented pre and post-treatment to 
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determine whether, if metacognitive frequency and themes were to decrease, ED symptoms 
would follow suit.  Continuing to examine the function of metacognitions in AN may aid 
those living with AN and decrease their suffering. The future looks hopeful, as closely 
studying metacognitions has lead to metacogitively-based treatments that have helped 
countless other individuals suffering from mental illness find the road to recovery. 
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Appendix B: Recruitment Flyers 
FEMALE 
PARTICIPANTS 
WANTED! 
We are looking for dieting and non-dieting females to participate in a study 
about metacognitions (the way people think about their thoughts) relating to 
their shape, weight, and eating. 
Participants will be asked to complete several questionnaires that inquire about 
their thinking processes regarding shape, weight and eating. The information 
that participants provide will be compared with identical questionnaires given to 
females with Anorexia Nervosa. This research will help us understand more 
about the factors that maintain eating disorders and how these factors are similar 
or different between dieting and non-dieting females.   
The study will take about 30 minutes. Participants will receive a reimbursement 
of a $5 Countdown supermarket voucher. 
If you are interested in participating in this study or would like to know more, 
contact jaimee.kleinbichler@pg.canterbury.ac.nz. I can also be found in room 
711 of the Psychology building and on Ext. 3638 
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Appendix C: Information Sheet 
Information Sheet 
 
A comparison of thinking processes (metacognitions)  
in Anorexia Nervosa, dieting and non-dieting females 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted as part of a Masters Thesis 
for the University of Canterbury. Researchers at the University of Canterbury Jaimee Kleinbichler 
(thesis student) and Janet Carter (thesis supervisor) are conducting this study in collaboration with 
Rachel Lawson, Clinical Head of the South Island Eating Disorders Services Unit. This study will 
help us understand how metacognitive processes contribute to maintaining symptoms of Anorexia 
Nervosa as well as how metacognitions are similar or different in women dieting and in those not 
dieting. Metacognitions are positive and negative beliefs people hold that influence the way in which 
thoughts are regulated and experienced. 
The study will be conducted at the University of Canterbury and the South Island Eating 
Disorder Service. Approximately 100 dieting and non-dieting females will be recruited at the 
University for this study. About 20 participants will be recruited at the South Island Eating Disorders 
Services Unit, and an additional 6-12 participants from the South Island Eating Disorders Services 
Unit will be filling out questionnaires at pre and post treatment. Our aim is to examine the nature and 
extent of metacognitions in relation to weight, shape, and eating in a sample of female university 
students currently dieting, not dieting, and in adult females diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criteria 
Participants from the University of Canterbury and from the South Island Eating Disorders Services 
Unit must be female and at least 18 years of age to take part in this study. 
Participation 
Your participation is entirely voluntary (your choice). You do not have to take part in this 
study. If you do agree to take part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 
having to give a reason. Recruitment for this study will continue until mid 2012. Please feel free to 
take until May (University participants) or July (South Island Eating Disorder Services participants) 
of 2012 to decide if you would like to participate. If you decide to participate, we would ask you to 
fill out a number of questionnaires. You do not have to answer all the questions, and you may stop at 
any time. 
About the study 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions regarding demographics (age, education, 
ethnicity, height, weight etc.), metacognitions, worry, and rumination (rumination refers to 
contemplation or reflection, which may become persistent and recurrent worrying or brooding). We 
will also ask for information regarding your thoughts, feelings and behaviours about eating, mood, 
and anxiety. Filling out these questionnaires will take about 20 - 30 minutes. 
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Benefits, risk, and safety 
Participation in this project will increase our understanding of metacognitions in dieting and 
non-dieting samples, the role metacognitions play in Anorexia, and the association of metacognitions 
with the expression of Anorexia symptoms. We will be able to identify harmful metacogntions that 
perhaps lead to and maintain mental health problems and understand how the content, extent, and 
frequency of metacognitions compare across the three groups studied. With this information on 
metacognitions, we may potentially be able to determine specific risk or protective factors for 
Anorexia Nervosa. 
When filling out the questionnaires, certain questions about personal details may upset or 
disturb you. If you find that you identify any problems that you are worried about, you have any 
queries, or would like to talk to somebody, we will be readily available to do so. If needed, we can 
discuss possible appropriate referral options with you.  
If you have any queries or concerns regarding your rights as a participant in this study, you 
may wish to contact an independent health and disability advocate: 
Free phone: 0800 555 050 
Free fax: 0800 2 SUPPORT (0800 2787 7678) 
Email: advocacy@hdc.org.nz 
 
Confidentiality 
Please note that all information provided for this study will be treated with the utmost 
confidence. Participation in this study is anonymous. All personal information will be securely stored, 
and accessible only by the investigators of this study. No material that could personally identify you 
will be used in any reports that will subsequently be written. 
Reimbursement 
All participants will receive a $5 Countdown supermarket voucher upon completion of the 
questionnaires. 
Information regarding the findings of this study 
Although individual results will be kept strictly confidential, a summary of the findings from 
this research will be made available to all of the participants and we will be pleased to send you a 
copy upon completion of the study. The overall results gathered will be used for the purpose of this 
study and will contribute to the scientific knowledge on the effects that metacognitions have in the 
expression and maintenance of Anorexia Nervosa symptoms. 
 
Statement of approval 
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This study has received ethical approval from the Upper South A Regional Ethics 
Committee, ethics reference number URA/11/09/052. 
 
Please feel free to contact the researchers if you have any questions about this study. 
 
Jaimee Kleinbichler  
Masters Thesis Student  
Psychology Building, Room 711  
Ph. 364 2987 x 3638  
jaimee.kleinbichler@pg.canterbury.ac.nz   
 
Janet Carter 
Supervisor, Senior lecturer, Senior Clinical Psychologist 
Private Bag 4800 
Psychology Department 
University of Canterbury 8140 
Ph. 364 2987 x 8090 
janet.carter@canterbury.ac.nz 
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Appendix D: Consent Form 
Consent Form 
 
A comparison of thinking processes (metacognitions)  
in Anorexia Nervosa, dieting and non-dieting females 
 
I have read and I understand the information sheet for volunteers taking part in this study designed to 
examine the nature and extent of metacognitions in relation to weight, shape, and eating in a sample 
of female university students currently dieting and not dieting, and in adult females diagnosed with 
Anorexia Nervosa. 
I have had the opportunity to discuss this study. I am satisfied with the answers I have been given. 
I have had the opportunity to use whānau support or a friend to help me ask questions and understand 
the study. 
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice), and that I may withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no material that could identify 
me will be used in any reports on this study. 
I have had time to consider whether to take part in the study. 
I know who to contact if I have any concerns about the study. 
I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study in general. 
I wish to receive a copy of the results (circle one).         
Yes   No 
If Yes, please provide email address: 
I would like the researcher to discuss the outcomes of the study with me. Yes  No 
I would like my GP to be informed of my participation in this study   Yes   No  
I would like my GP to receive a summary of my individual results from the questionnaires I  
complete. Yes   No 
If yes, please record your GPs name, address, and phone number below: 
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I (…….…………………………………………………………………………...full name) hereby 
consent to take part in this study.  
Signature: 
 
Date: 
 
 
Project explained by: 
Jaimee Kleinbichler  
Masters Thesis Student   
Psychology Building, Room 711   
Ph. Ext.3638  
Jaimee.kleinbichler@pg.canterbury.ac.nz   
 
 
Supervisor: 
Janet Carter 
Senior lecturer, Senior Clinical Psychologist 
Private Bag 4800 
Psychology Department 
University of Canterbury 8140 
Ph. 364 2987 x 8090 
janet.carter@canterbury.ac.nz 
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Appendix E: The Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS) 
PBRS 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When depressive thinking is 
prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs that 
people have about rumination. Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each belief 
carefully and indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the number that best 
describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
 
1   Do not agree 
2   Agree Slightly 
3   Agree Moderately 
4   Agree Very Much 
 
1 In order to understand my feelings of depression I need to ruminate about my 
problems 
1 2 3 4 
2 I need to ruminate about the bad things that have happened in the past to make 
sense of them 
1 2 3 4 
3 I need to ruminate about my problems to find the causes of my depression 1 2 3 4 
4 Ruminating about my problems helps me to focus on the most important things. 1 2 3 4 
5 Ruminating about the past helps me to prevent future mistakes and failures 1 2 3 4 
6 I need to ruminate about my problems to find my answers to my depression 1 2 3 4 
7 Ruminating about my feelings helps me to understand past mistakes and failures 1 2 3 4 
8 Ruminating about my depression helps me to understand past mistakes and 
failures 
1 2 3 4 
9 Ruminating about the past helps me to work out how things could have been 
done better 
1 2 3 4 
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Appendix F: The Negative Beliefs about Rumination (NBRS) 
NBRS 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When depressive thinking is 
prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs that 
people have about rumination. Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each belief 
carefully and indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the number that best 
describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
1   Do not agree 
2   Agree Slightly 
3   Agree Moderately 
4   Agree Very Much 
 
1 Ruminating makes me physically ill 1 2 3 4 
2 When I ruminate I can‟t do anything else 1 2 3 4 
3 Ruminating means I‟m out of control 1 2 3 4 
4 Everyone would desert me if they knew how much I ruminate about myself. 1 2 3 4 
5 People will reject me if I ruminate 1 2 3 4 
6 Ruminating about my problems is uncontrollable 1 2 3 4 
7 Ruminating about my depression could make me kill myself 1 2 3 4 
8 Ruminating will turn into a failure 1 2 3 4 
9 I cannot stop myself from ruminating 1 2 3 4 
10 Ruminating means I‟m a bad person 1 2 3 4 
11 It is impossible not to ruminate about the bad things that have happened in the 
past 
1 2 3 4 
12 Only weak people ruminate 1 2 3 4 
13 Ruminating can make me harm myself 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix G: The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
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Appendix H: The Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire 
RRQ 
Instructions: 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by 
circling one of the scale categories to the right of each statement.  Use the scale as shown 
below:  
 
Strongly    Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop 
thinking about. ...................................................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 2. I always seem to be "re-hashing" in my mind recent things I've said 
or done. .............................................................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 3. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself. ..........................  1     2     3     4     5 
 4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep 
going back to what happened. ...........................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 5. I tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me for a really 
long time afterward. ...........................................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 6. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with. ......................  1     2     3     4     5 
 7. Often I'm playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation. .............  1     2     3     4     5 
 8. I often find myself re-evaluating something I've done. ........................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 9. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long. ..............................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. ...............................  1     2     3     4     5 
 11. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern 
myself with. ........................................................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 12. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or 
disappointing moments. .....................................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
   
 13. Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn't appeal to me that much. ...................  1     2     3     4     5 
 14. I'm not really a meditative type of person. ..........................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 15. I love exploring my "inner" self. ..........................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 16. My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me. .........................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 17. I don't really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. .............................  1     2     3     4     5 
 18. I love analyzing why I do things. ........................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 19. People often say I'm a "deep", introspective type of person. ..............................  1     2     3     4     5 
 20. I don't care much for self-analysis. .....................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 21. I'm very self-inquisitive by nature. ......................................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 22. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things. .....................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 23. I often love to look at my life in philosophical ways. ...........................................  1     2     3     4     5 
 24. Contemplating myself isn't my idea of fun. .........................................................  1     2     3     4     5 
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 Appendix I: Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire 4 (EDE-Q4) 
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Appendix J: The Eating Attitudes Test-26 (EAT-26) 
Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) 
Age: _____ Current Weight: ______ Highest weight (excluding pregnancy): _____ 
Sex: _____ Height: _____ Lowest Adult Weight: ______ Ideal Weight: ______ 
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Appendix K: Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS) 
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Appendix L: General demographics questions used 
A comparison of thinking processes (metacognitions)  
in Anorexia Nervosa, dieting and non-dieting females 
 
 
Please complete the following information: 
 
Note: You do not have to answer all the questions in this booklet and you may stop at 
any time. 
 
 
Are you currently dieting in an attempt to lose weight? (please circle)   
 
Yes No 
 
 
If yes, describe your current diet plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
How long have you been dieting? 
 
 
What dieting rules are you trying to following, whether or not you are successful? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your date of birth? 
 
 
 
 
How many years of high school have you completed? 
 
 
 
 
How many years of University have you completed? 
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How many years of other tertiary education have you completed? 
 
 
 
 
Please specify what type of tertiary education you completed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What ethnicity do you identify with? Please tick one or more boxes. 
 NZ European 
 Maori 
 Samoan 
 Cook Island Maori 
 Tongan  
 Niuean 
 Chinese 
 Indian 
 Other (please specify): 
 
 
 
What is your current marital status? 
 Married (or living together 1+ years) 
 Separated 
 Divorced 
 Widowed 
 Never married  
 
 
 
What is your current weight (kg)? 
 
 
 
 
What is your current height (m)? 
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The following questions are regarding your eating, weight and shape. Take as much 
space as you need to answer these questions. If you run out of room, more paper will be 
provided for you. 
 
1a. What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your eating? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1b. What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your eating? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2a. What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your weight? 
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2b. What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your weight? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3a. What are the advantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your shape? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3c. What are the disadvantages of having negative/anxious thoughts about your shape? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
